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INLUCETUA
Comment by the Editor

A Xenophobe by Any Other Name
On campuses at least, we're doing a lot of talking
about global awareness. But suddenly, the other
communities of which we are a part have become a lot
more globally aware than they ever meant to be. We
don't need the pictures in the news magazines to tell us
that a good many of our friends and neighbors, or at
least their kids, find themselves in places many of us
couldn't spell two months ago.
It probably isn't surprising, given the fact that
nations in war postures are not at their best, that our
public language about Arab nations, leaders, culture
and peoples leaves room for improvement. Edward
Said, admittedly not known for moderation or tact, but
a great truth-teller nonetheless, wrote recently in Tlu!
Nation that most of what appears in the press about
these countries is a "repetition of appalling cliches,
most of them ignorant, unhistorical, moralistic, selfrighteous and hypocritical." Blunt, but accurate. (And
I thought Arabs were the masters of subtlety, the darkly
intriguing and mysterious veiled intimations of what is
suspected, but unspoken, etc., etc.)
Reliance on stereotypic language dominates the
popular press, at least in most of its descriptions.
Reading Newsweek and Time on Arabic cultures is like
watching flickering old Valentino clips-remember
how the eyes would whiten and widen under that thing
wrapped around his head? Oooo, shudder. The
Other! Turn on the lights! The desert is "barren,
hostile," the entertainment is non-existent: "no booze,
no babes" commented one AP report, in just those
words. You have the feeling you've seen all this before
somewhere, and it turns out to be Beau Geste.
This would be amusing if it weren't so important.
Our ignorance of the world will kill us, or kill some of
us that we don't want to lose. Iraqis are not cut-out
figures that stand in the lobby of the theatre where
Lawrence of Arabia is showing. We need to know who
they are, not what some producer (in or out of the
Pentagon) fools us into thinking they are. Those who
have been talking for years about Americans becoming

better acquainted with the world as it is seemed to have
been getting somewhere. On our campus, we have
noticed a renewed interest in multicultural affairs and
world issues. But recent events threaten to move us all
backward toward a preference for fantasy and
stereotype. Only real knowledge, painstakingingly
gained with time and study, can protect us from the
distorted untruths that get promulgated in times of
conflict. Let us try to make these times a reminder to
pursue such knowledge with even greater
determination. 0

The Cresset Colloquium
It is our great pleasure to publish in this issue the
first three of five articles on the broadly related topics
of nature, creation, metaphors and religion. Last
spring, five members of the faculty read together a
number of texts, discussing and arguing and
attempting to get closer to understanding these major
elements of our thinking about the world and the way
we inhabit it. The texts were a selection of Luther's
writings on the creation, Sallie McFague's Models of
God, Jon Levenson's Creation and tlu! Persistence of Evi~
and Roderick Nash's Tlu! Rights of Nature. As you will
see, the results of their work are various, as one might
expect from a gathering that included theologian,
philosopher, mathematician, lawyer and poet. The
Frederic E. Church on this month's cover recalls for us
an ethic and an aesthetic about nature that seemed to
work well enough for the nineteenth century. Today
that wide-eyed but confident gaze will not carry us
through. Though we have increased the extent of our
power over nature, a relationship based on power and
control looks increasingly problematic. So, read with
pleasure-and with the expectation of work to come.
Peace,
GME
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Shipwreck, Household, and the End of Nature
Philip N. Gilbertson
We have often described our summer home on
Flathead Lake in Montana as a "wooden tent" so that
friends back East would not imagine our living in a
Lincoln log cabin in the mountains. My wife and I
spent many years dreaming about what sort of dwelling
would provide modest, affordable shelter in this
paradise. Thoreau no doubt spent less time planning
his household in the woods, but then he had in mind a
two-year stint, and we were building for at least the
next two generations in a place which had been a
spiritual power center for me since the early fifties. I
am writing this essay from that wooden tent, propped
on a ledge I dug out of the steep rock hillside with a
pickaxe ten years ago. We had bought the acre of land
the year our son-now eighteen-was born, so we had
time to plan how we would build a household on the
bay inside Angel Point, a few miles north of the
Flathead Indian Reservation, an hour south of the
border, just northwest of Norm Maclean country.

I confess that this two-decade attempt to build a
wilderness household with a modest sense of
permanence has shaped my thinking about nature
significantly enough to remind me of Wendell Berry,
the Kentucky farmer who in his essays sees the world
through his fields and forests. It is easy to imagine the
natural world as an ally, a friendly neighbor, who
permeates the boundaries of our property with ease,
because this corner of the wilderness is really quite
domesticated. Even though a pair of bald eagles fish in
our bay, sighting a black bear is a rare event. We drink
the lake water, but also heat it electrically for showers.
To take a hard look at the environmental catastrophes
of our time, therefore, is for me to approach the scene
of an auto wreck with my seatbelt in place and the
doors locked-the alarm is at arm's distance
frightening for its spectacle, but not my agony. Beyond
Wendell Berry's clear analysis of the dilemmas we have
created for ourselves and our children, he rarely loses
that calm assurance that comes from daily nurturing
Philip N. Gilbertson, Dean of the College of Arts and
Sciences at VU, is trained in literature, but currently exercises
his analytical skills in administration. He [zshes when he can,
and writes poetry when he must. His poems have appeared in
The Cresset.
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the land. In his poem "The Wages of History," Berry
laments "Men's negligence and their 1 fatuous
ignorance and abuse" that have "made a hardship of
this earth."
Doomed, bound and doomed
to the repair of history to death,
we must cover over the stones
with soil for tomorrow's bread
while the present eludes us.
[we] must live drawn out and nearly
broken between past and future
because of our history's wages,
bad work left behind us,
demanding to be done again.
Yet Berry's landscape is a lens to see his own
relationship with the earth more fruitfully. The daily
building and renewal of his farm shapes Berry's
exploration through the dilemmas with more grace
and hope. Our house on the lake does that for us. And
I continue to be surprised how often it shapes my
thinking of the earth as household.
The great dramas of human cultures deal with
households-from Gilgamesh and Oedipus to King
Lear and Long Day's Journey into Night. The damnation
and salvation equation of our quest to find wholeness
within the human family is imaged in the microcosmic
ecology of individual families and individual
households. The metaphor of household binds
together freight and fright-past and futuredeepening the image of our global plight.
Few acres now exist that are not part of human
design, wilderness included. Indeed, the American
wilderness was always ~lso the Garden of Paradise; and
life, however crude, was always seen to be lived in a
house, if only Huck's and Jim's raft, rather than in
Tom Sawyer's toy cave. This ambivalence about the
wilderness has permitted all of us to accommodate its
domestication. Our own acre on Flathead Lake is wild,
but a garden nonetheless. As our era began to view the
earth whole for the first time, we could begin to see
that the limitlessness of the horizon on ocean or
American prairie was only a trompe l'oei~ soon to be
overwhelmed by development, right up to the oil spill
of Valdez and the acid rain of black forests soon to
become "die back."
The Cressel
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McKibbon calls this phenomenon The End of
Nature. McKibbon has produced the nineties version
of Jonathan Schell's The Fate of the Earth which
crystalized imaginations of nuclear holocaust for the
eighties. McKibbon's book attempts to describe the
far-reaching consequences of the environmental crisis
in terms of the global domestication of nature-we
have made all wilderness our nest, and we have soiled
it, apparently beyond hope of recovering it adequately
even to call it "nature" again. The effluents of CFCs,
carbon dioxide, methane, and nitrous oxide have
virtually killed it off.
The crisis is so fundamental that McKibbon
describes it in theological terms. For ¥cKibbon,
nature is the incarnation-the concretion-of God's
presence on earth. Nature has been a perennial
benevolent Other; and now "we have deprived nature
of its independence, and that is fatal to its meaning.
Nature's independence is its meaning; without it there
is nothing but us" (58). McKibbon, a Methodist,
reaches to transcendentalist Thoreau for theological
reassurance that the Divine Order displayed in nature
had meant something critically important to us after
all. It is "infinitely sad" (79), therefore, that God has
permitted us to achieve the godlike power to turn the
wilds into a zoo and thus banish language formerly
reserved for the mysterium.
This domestication of nature is for McKibbon a
colossal loss of what is most precious about it: its alien
wildness. Thoreau had dared to say, "In wildness is the
preservation of the earth." McKibbon describes the
wholesale of that wilderness which had managed to
outlast centuries of explorers:
We have changed the aunosphere, and that will change the
weather. T.he temperature and rainfall are no longer to be
entirely the work of some separate, uncivilized force, but
instead in part a product of our habits, our economies, our
ways of life. Even in the most remote wilderness, where the
strictest laws forbid the felling of a single tree, the sound of
that [chain] saw will be clear, a walk in the woods will be
changed-tainted by its whine. The world outdoors will
mean much the same thing as the world indoors, the hill the
same thing as the house. (47-48)
On the one hand, McKibbon complains that "We
can no longer imagine that we are part of something
larger than ourselves-that is what all this boils down
to" (83). Yet this "something larger" is lost because we
have domesticated it. We replaced the hand of God
with our smelly paw to make the entire globe our yard,
a bumbling "science-fair project"
McKibbon has little time for talk about the
environment that tries to paper over this cosmic loss.
Devotees of James Lovelock's "Gaia hypothesis," for
example, who see humans as the engineers of an earth
October, 1990

that is a self-regulating single organism, are deluding
us by talk of perpetuating the earth through our own
rational management. The earth may survive, admits
McKibbon, but it will be a sickly hothouse variety. The
"deep ecology" movement is much more to
McKibbon's liking because its followers assume a
fundamental humility in relation to the earth that
places all human desires subservient to the
commonwealth of nature. Political metaphors enter
the debate about ecological ethics, as Roderick Nash's
The Rights of Nature tells, because questions of virtue in
community inevitably get hammered out in our society
as rights and interests. If human self-interest were
defined as coterminous with the whole biotic
community, many environmental ethicists could
accommodate the centrality of human ethics in
relation to nature. The problem, however, is similar to
that faced in antebellum America: "The ethical
community ended then at the line between white and
black; now it ends, for many, at the human-nature
boundary" (212).
For McKibbon, however, the problem is that
humans have already passed the boundaries of
defilement, and the loss is permanent because the loss
is a concept of nature: If forest and rain and cloud all
bear the stamp of our hand, nature, no longer separate
from us, "loses its special power. Instead of being a
category like God-something beyond our control-it
is now a category like the defense budget or the
minimum wage, a problem we must work out" (210).
The language of law and politics applied to foxes and
redwoods, McKibbon would say, simply confirms the
fundamental conceptual shift that has occurred in our
time: the prairie has become polis, the clouds have
been brought to court. Nonetheless, McKibbon's
lament ends in a call for "A Path of More Resistance"
(his final chapter title) that picks up Roderick Nash's
rallying cry for a new abolitionism, an abolitionist
movement to liberate nature so enslaved. McKibbon
finally resorts to this model of civility, on a model of
increased domestication of nature from the outlawry of
our abuse, in order to liberate nature again to itself. If
this sounds contradictory, it is because McKibbon has
little choice but to turn again to metaphors of the
human community to articulate his appeal for help.
McKibbon longs for a wilderness unaltered by
human choices, but he seems unable to come to terms
with this transformation of nature as a fundamental
cultural directive of Western societies for centuries.
The West's enslavement of alien peoples may have
preceded the abuse of their land and their
surrounding wildernesses, but not by much. Yet I do
not want to mislead: McKibbon's earnest description
of a bleak globe is quite factual, and his grim
5

projections reasonable. It is fruitless to argue whether
or not McKibbon is wrong about the "end of nature."
His argument helps us reconsider the meddlesomeness
of our play with nature, and his assertion should weave
into the fabric of our thinking if we are to come to
terms with what our culture means for the fate of the
earth.
But in his horror over the human contamination
of the global ecosystem, McKibbon loses balance in
understanding our perennial relationship with nature:
"What will it mean to come across a rabbit in the woods
once genetically engineered 'rabbits' are widespread?
Why would we have any more reverence or affection
for such a rabbit than we would for a Coke bottle?"
(211) Well, the non-native rainbow trout that my son
and I catch and release in Jewel Basin lakes above the
Flathead valley are not for us trademarks. Wendell
Berry, with his feet planted firmly for decades in that
Kentucky soil, takes on this reductive thinking that
allows McKibbon to lapse into silliness. (If summer
weather is now man-made, complains McKibbon, then
"it will not be summer, just as even the best prosthesis
is not a leg" [59]). Berry has watched the ants and the
beavers and understands nature differently:
What we call nature is, in a sense, the sum of the
changes made by all the various creatures and natural forces
in their intricate actions and influences upon each other and
upon their places. . .. [H]umans must make a choice as to
the kind and scale of the difference they make. If they
choose to make too small a difference, they diminish their
humanity. If they choose to make too great a difference, they
diminish nature, and narrow their subsequent choices;
ultimately, they diminish or destroy themselves. (1989, 7)
Berry recognizes that nature does not cordon off
the human, and any complex understanding of
wilderness must come to terms with human
interchange. God's Incarnation is an underlying
metaphor for this fusion of all realms of reality. This
stance toward nature grows out of the Reformation. As
Paul Santmire points out, Luther and Calvin turned
Thomas' and Dante's metaphors of spiritual ascent
from the world into metaphors of God's descent into
earth, seeing the fecundity of nature imbued with
God's love that bonds humans with all creatures.
The idea of wilderness has a long and prominent
history in our culture. In Wilderness and Paradise in
Christian Thought, George Williams traces that history
from the Hebrews to contemporary America and
uncovers its rich ambiguities. Wilderness has been for
our culture the realm of death and refuge, testing and
consecration, land of demons and provisional
paradise-all wondrously recapitulated
in
Shakespeare's The Tempest. Williams observes that in
the ancient world, the West tended to see the
6

wilderness as the desert battlefield of spiritual warfare,
whereas the East was drawn to it as the locus of
contemplation. For the House of Israel, the landscape
was a vast stage set for the contentious drama of
creation and redemption. Essentially wilderness was
not treated as something Other, that pristine realm
McKibbon yearns for, unviolated by human dreck, but
rather as the battlefield of men and cosmic forces.
Thus Santmire sees in biblical history and text little
encouragement for an ecological theology, though he
finds some promise in recent scholarship that stresses
the importance of the biblical wilderness as both God's
gift and blessing which redefines the human
relationship to the land. This long history makes clear,
however, that the preservation of nature in a state
unaltered by human activity-a land utterly apart to be
isolated for its own sake-is simply not an idea
nurtured in our cultural conversation.
The most radical of the deep ecologists point to
this history as the legacy of error, of course, and call us
to contemplate the expendability of humanity in order
to preserve the biotic community. But neither
McKibbon nor I am prepared to endorse this notion,
and again Wendell Berry best explains why . "In
wildness is the preservation of the world" as Thoreau
said, but Wendell Berry follows that truth with its
opposite: "so long at least as humans are in the world,
in human culture is the preservation of wildnesswhich is equally, and more demandingly true." ( 1989,
11) Berry seeks the continuities between the wild and
the domestic as the way of wisdom for wholeness and
joy.
In his marvelous essay "Preserving Wildness,"
Berry leads us through wilderness territory with
wisdom and grace, not McKibbon's fustian and
frustration. Listen to these final points in his list of
assumptions about wilderness:
5. It is not possible (at least, not for very long) for
humans to intend their own good specifically or exclusively.
We cannot intend our good, in the long run, without
intending the good of our place-which means, ultimately,
the good of the world.
6. To use or not to use nature is not a choice that is
available to us; we can live only at the expense of other lives.
Our choice has rather to do with how and how much to use .. ..
7. If there is no escape from the human use of nature,
then human good cannot be simply synonymous with natural
good. (1989, 139)
Wildness and domesticity are indivisible. Such is
the nature of our being in the world. No wonder our
metaphors and models of talking about preserving the
wilderness are all tied up with human referents. But as
Berry goes on to say, this also "is a spiritual
predicament, for it requires us to be properly humble
and grateful; time and again, it asks us to be still and
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wait But it is also a practical problem, for it requires
us to do things" (1989, 139).
Our talk about the relationship between God,
humanity, and creation often pivots on the models we
use, either by choice or by acculturation, to describe
that relationship. Models and metaphors, as the stuff
oflanguage, are unavoidable in talking about nature or
God or the human community. The kinds of verbal
and visual models we use are therefore unavoidably
important.
For two centuries now, our culture has been
searching for a new mythology beyond the biblical
texts that can carry human hope and aspiration. If the
Enlightenment Project which preceded this era found
hope in the Empire of Reason, the Romantic
Projection through the last two centuries has been a
search for an adequate myth that can incorporate
experience mysteriously unaccounted for by the
Enlightenment. The contemporary American poet
Gary Snyder, in Turtle Island, says the hope lies not in
the radical transformation of societies, but rather in
"seizing the key images, myths, archetypes,
eschatologies, and ecstasies so that life won't seem
worth living unless one's on the transforming energy's
side" (101). Sallie McFague's Models of God is such a
fruitful study of these fundamental images, our verbal
models about reality, because she brings together all
the current strands of conversation in theology in
order to reexamine the metaphors that build God's
community on earth.
McFague constructs a convincing case that the
biblical models of God such as king, ruler and
patriarch are no longer as helpful as they once were to
describe our relationship with God and the earth. The
political metaphors I referred to earlier to describe the
deep ecologist's call for a new abolitionist movement
on behalf of nature are an extension of the traditional
biblical metaphors of God's dominion over the earth.
In a nuclear and ecological age, where the survival of
the planet as well as humanity is at risk, McFague
presents models of God that accentuate God's
immanence in creation in "forms of fundamental
intimacy, mutuality, and relatedness"(85). She chooses
to speak of God as mother, lover, and friend to draw
our attention to God's activity in the natural world
among us. Like Berry, McFague is drawn to more
personal, domestic metaphors to capture the defming
qualities of God, humanity, and nature as primarily
relational.
Ship and house have been elementary artifacts of
Western culture first delineated in The Odyssey. In the
past two centuries, they have become illuminating (if
only minor) motifs that can help us to understand the
October; 1990

kind of relationship to the natural world that Wendell
Berry describes, and how this relationship is enhanced
by revising some of our talk about God, as Sallie
McFague suggests. Ship may be our house afloat, but it
is our preeminent cultural image for the journey to
discovery and individuation; it defines much of the
character of our culture. Ship is separation from home,
a dwelling place where household shapes our
attachments, connections, and community.
The "spaceship earth" of Buckminster Fuller and
the "life-boat ethic" of Garrett Hardin in the 1970s
drew on a long heritage of nautical images to describe
the circumscription of the globe by human
achievement, which in turn created a world crafted
wholly for human habitation, fragile to human
destruction. The potential for shipwreck of this globe
looms larger than ever before.
When the Romantics of the nineteenth century
discovered the limitlessness of their world (in his
Journals and Papers of 1836, Kierkegaard shrewdly
observed that creative boundary-breaking lay at the
heart of Romanticism: "... the romantic lies essentially
in flowing over all boundaries."), they often, almost
obsessively, imaged the threat of personal risk with the
public disaster of shipwreck. Admittedly, despite the
epidemic of colossal oil spills today, shipwreck no
longer carries its terror much beyond the Titanic ; the
Andrea Doria is a forgotten encore. But for nineteenth
century Romantics, who risked disintegration of self in
their creative flights, shipwreck served as a most
forceful emblem of daring and disaster, life imperiled
as it sought wholeness through a new encounter with
the universe. If the sea epitomized the sublime as a
wild, incomprehensible power beyond human control,
it also symbolized the ultimate quest of the spirit which
risked the shipwreck of tremulous disorder and
diffusion. Percy Shelley's life literally shipwrecked-a
lone non-swimmer, capsized in his own sailboat--could
serve as sign for the times, for even though the
shipwreck image draws its power primarily because it
depicts momentous mass death, from Coleridge's
Mariner to Baudelaire's "Bateau ivre" to Ibsen's Peer
Gynt it symbolized the high stakes of modern times.
Ibsen wrote to Georg Brandes: "On the whole these are
times when the entire history of the world strikes me as
being one enormous shipwreck."
For our time the parallel image may still be the
Bomb (not yet the contaminated greenhouse), but for
that era the power of the shipwreck image lay in its
identifYing community disaster, wrought in the cosmic
context of the infinite and terrifying sea, with the
personal peril of individual risk. The life-risk was the
inward quest for oceanic wholeness with the unending
plenitude of life, a fusion of humanness and nature
7

and God. Thoreau, a surveyor who laid out and
trespassed boundaries by profession, frequently
described his own self as open-ended, saw his life as a
borderer of the ocean: "My life is like a stroll upon the
beach, As near the ocean's edge as I can go." ("The
Shipwreck") The notion of shipwreck as an event of
the mind caught at full expansion, caught by
reminders of incomprehensible disorder, destruction,
and death, signals for us the human and personal
meaning of the disaster image. Shipwreck describes the
end of many personal journeys that seek to
circumnavigate the globe and in so doing bring that
globe toward destruction. While The Odyssey
dramatizes shipwrecks, the story, we should recall, is
about a man's struggle to return home from war.
Upon return, the work of household is not escape and
withdrawal: Odysseus exacts his savage judgment
against the warrior-leeches' violations of hospitality and
their indifference to the homeless stranger. This tum
away from world-remaking to the justice of caretaking
is explored thoughtfully by Sharon Parks, who sees the
image of home as a corrective for a society at the end
of its tether:
At this pivotal, dangerous, and promising moment in
history, the formation of adequate forms of meaning and
faith-and perhaps the future of our small planet home--is
dependent, in part, upon the liberation, reappropriation,
and renewed companionship of the metaphors of
detachment and connection, pilgrims and homemakers,
journeying and homesteading. (301)
McFague explores the model of God as
mother/parent who births, nourishes and seeks
fulfillment for her creation of humanity and nature.
What McFague describes is a caretaker of a "cosmic
household" who understands the "interdependence
and interrelatedness of all species. The mother-God as
creator, then, is also involved in 'economics,' the
management of the household of the universe, to
insure the just distribution of goods" (114). The ethics
that follow from such thinking link justice for all
peoples with liberation for the natural order in the
household of God. Earth as household can thus model
for us the relationship-- the mutuality-we have with
all of nature. Gary Snyder's sixties book, Earth House
Hold, for all its panegyrical romanticism, captures this
mingling of human nature and creation that still
survives in many remnant tribal cultures: "Thus nature
leads into nature-the wilderness-and the
reciprocities and balances by which man lives on earth.
Ecology: 'eco' (oikos) meaning 'house' (cf.
'ecumenical'): Housekeeping on Earth" (127). If the
earth is our household, we may care for it like our table
and bed and children. For all of the transientness and
fragmentation of households in our time, household
8

remains the seedbed of our future that deserves our
nurturing. Keeping of the household, as Sharon Parks
says, "is the creation of forms and patterns which
cultivate and shelter life itself" (304).
During the years my family and I dreamed and
fashioned our Montana mountain household, I have
been an itinerant academic. We have lived in sixteen
different houses in the past twenty-five years. But here
on the deck of our cabin at Flathead Lake, it is easy to
see the cosmic household. In the ocean of midnight,
the foamy Milky Way almost sprays us with stars, and in
the morning the wide bay is always our front yard. A
few years ago, when the Parkinsons down the road sold
their 25-acre Oleo Ranch to retire in Oklahoma, they
left a huge, cast-iron wood stove in the kitchen of their
shack; they couldn't haul it out through the door. A
few nights after they abandoned it, the little ranch
house got a garage-door sized, chain-sawed hole in its
side and the stove was gone. We have to think about
households when we close up at the end of every
summer season, as we work to keep a household secure
enough to nurture us again next year. To imagine the
earth as the household of God allows us to imagine
again our responsibilities back here in Valparaiso and
how they are tied to that Montana wilderness. As
Wendell Berry says:
The only thing we have to preserve nature with is
culture; the only thing we have to preserve wildness with is
domesticity. (1989, 143)
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II
Mapping Nature and Nature's God: Models for
Understanding Creation
Robert F. Blomquist

Understanding the meaning of Creation presents
humanity with one of its biggest issues as we slide into
the new millennium. Since in times of crisis and decision we turn most readily to those we know to be wise
guides, let me begin with a quote from farmer-philosopher Wendell Berry:
There appears to be a law that when creatures have
reached the level of consciousness, as men have, they become
conscious of the creation; they must learn how they fit into it
and what its needs are and what it requires of them, or else
pay a terrible penalty: the spirit of the creation will go out of
them, and they will become destructive; the very earth will
depart from them and go where they cannot follow. (11, 17)
Indeed, those who seek to "learn how they fit into"
creation often resort to metaphor, but may go beyond
metaphors of the created world to make metaphorical
reference to the God (or gods) of creation. For
instance, Annie Dillard, in "Tickets for a Prayer
Wheel":
My sister
dreamed of a sculpture
showing the form of God.
He has no edges,
and the holes in Him spin.
He alone is real,
and all things lie in Him
as fossil shells
curl in solid shale.
My sister dreamed of God
who moves around
the spanding, spattered holes
of solar systems hollowed in His side.
While metaphor is necessary and enlightening
when one seeks to understand creation, is it sufficient?
As any metaphorical writings about creation suggest,
the conception of creation is unwieldy at best. It can
logically be linked to multiple cognate ideas, as one
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can find it in Mortimer Adler's Great Ideas taxonomy
under headings from God, Art, and Change, to Space
and Symbol. Given this range and vastness, is our
understanding of the meaning and significance of creation sufficiently complete after we have exhausted
our favorite creation metaphors or analogies? Or is
something else needed to fill out our understanding of
this difficult and elusive concept?
My thesis is that metaphor-religious, poetic, or
scientific - is not enough for a complete understanding of creation. Rather, metaphors of creation must be
supplemented by models of creation. As I shall try to
explain, model builders strive to be more rigorous and
demanding than metaphor makers. While models pose
certain risks, properly formulated and applied models
hold great promise for amplifying our understanding
and appreciation of the multifaceted complexities of
creation.
To support this thesis, I shall proceed by first
examining the differences and similarities between
metaphors and models; second, discussing certain
provocative models of nature recently developed by a
landscape architect and an environmental ethicist; and
third, noting the work and significance for this discussion of theologian Sallie McFague in her recent book,
Models of God. In conclusion, I will address some some
problems and prospects of modeling God and Nature.
Metaphorical thinking employs figures of speech
in which, according to a dictionary definition, "a term
is transferred from the object it ordinarily designates to
an object it may designate only by implicit comparison
or analogy." Metaphorical thought entails a materialization of experience where unity between diverse
objects is perceived and communicated. The several
poets who comment on metaphor in The Poet's Work
bear this out. For Delmore Schwartz, metaphorical
thinking involves "mak[ing] something new by putting
things and words together" involving "a bearing-across,
or bringing-together of things by means of words"
(Gibbons 82, 83). Metaphorical thinking-what many
equate with poetic thinking-is a form of soothsaying.
As Wallace Stevens observed, "It is necessary to be a
seer, to make oneself a seer. The poet [or metaphorical thinker] makes himself a seer by a long, immense
9

and reasoned unruliness of the senses .... He attains the
unknown" (Gibbons 48, 57).
While metaphors may reflect reality, more often
than not they entail a groping for a small portion of
reality, what Paul Valery describes as "a hesitation
between several different expressions of one thought,
an explosive incapacity that surpasses the necessary
and sufficient capacity" (Gibbons 170). In Gary
Snyder's words, metaphor "effects change by fiddling
with the archetypes and getting at people's dreams
about a century before it actually effects historical
change"(Gibbons 283).
Models, in contradistinction to metaphors, aspire
to systematic, comprehensive, and simulated versions
of reality. While several models are inspired and
informed by metaphors, modeling entails a search for
specific, identifiable, and measurable parameters (or
variables). These parameters seek, albeit imperfectly,
to reproduce the complexities of reality.
Mathematical modeling is the prototypical notion
of what models are all about. Mathematical modeling
can involve either of two kinds of mathematical representation: physical models or theoretical models. Some
reference to the Encyclopedia Britannica's article on the
"Mathematical Model" should help us get at an understanding:
Physical mathematical models include reproductions of
plane and solid geometric figures made of cardboard, wood,
plastic, or other substances; models of conic sections, curves
in space, or three-dimensional surfaces of various kinds made
of wire, plaster, or thread strung from frames; and models of
surfaces of higher order that make it possible to visualize
abstract mathematical concepts. (7, 932)
Theoretical models, on the other hand, use simulation of varying realities to create any number of
possible situations, factoring in human or natural intervention into a system, whether it is one of cloud
formation, traffic patterns, message transmission or
beach erosion.
Models, then, are rooted in the use of a metalanguage, firmly placed in the structures of Western
thinking about the cosmos and its essentially rational
harmony. Certainly the Enlightenment project is
premised on the belief that predictable consequences
can be arrived at by proper examination of phenomena. In fact, models can be, as the Britannica puts it
when discussing "Social Structures and Change," a new
method of problem solving, "analytical modes directed
toward the building of a variety of models of structure
and organization." Models, therefore, have a potential
of being used as models for future models. In other
words, one of the chief benefits of modeling is the ere-
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ation of a feedback loop which at least improves simulation, if it rarely perfects our understanding of reality.
Professor Ian McHarg, of the University of
Pennsylvania's Landscape Architect department, in his
provocative book Design With Nature, articulated a
model of better understanding nature minimizing
adverse environmental impact by human development.
Implementation of his model entails what he refers to
as "mapping" natural characteristics of the land in juxtaposition with proposed and alternative human
development projects. In applying his mapping
model-actually a dualistic model consisting of both a
physical as well as a theoretical reality componentMcHarg provides a familiar illustration of a development project: selection of a route for a highway.
According to McHarg:
It is clear that the highway route should be considered a
multipurpose rather than a single-purpose facility. It is also
clear that, when a highway route is so considered, there may
be conflicting objectives. As in other types of multipurpose
planning, the objeqive should be to maximize all potential
complementary social benefits at the least social cosL
This means that the shortest distance between two
points, meeting predetermined geometric standards, is not
the best route. Nor is the shortest distance over the cheapest
land. The best route is the one that provides the maximum
social benefit at the least social cost. (32-34)
McHarg amplifies the parameters of his model's
theoretical component by "identifying both social and
natural processes as social values," quantifying these
values, and ultimately ranking them. As he explains in
some detail:
We will agree that land and building values do reflect a
price value system, we can also agree that for institutions that
have no market value there is still a hierarchy in values. The
Capitol is more valuable than an undifferentiated house in
Washington, Independence Hall more precious than a house
in Philadelphia's Society Hill or Central Park more valuable
than any other in New York. So too with natural processes. It
is not difficult to agree that different rocks have a variety of
compressive strengths and thus offer both values and penalties for building; that some areas are immune; that certain
soils are more susceptible to erosion than others.
Additionally, there are comparative measures of water quantity and quality, soil draining characteristics. It is possible to
rank forest or marsh quality, in terms of species, numbers,
age and health in order of value. Wildlife habitats, scenic
quality, the importance of historic buildings, recreational
facilities can all be ranked. (34)
The physical component of McHarg's model of
nature comes into play when various physiographic factors (the need for structures, poor foundations, etc.)
and social values (both human and natural) are
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and social values (both human and natural) are
"mapped." He suggests that we can "map physiographic factors so that the darker the tone, the greater the
cost Let us similarly map social values so that the darker the tone, the higher the value. Let us make the
maps transparent When these are superimposed, the
least-social-cost areas are revealed by the lightest
tone"(32-34). Thus, according to McHarg's model of
reality, the highway should be constructed on the
"light" area of the map overlay.
McHarg acknowledges the shortcomings of his
model; yet, he urges its use because it is an improvement over any existing method. He claims that his
model "has the merit of incorporating the parameters
currently employed and adding new and important
social considerations, revealing their locational characteristics, permitting comparison, disclosing aggregates
of social values and costs" (34).
In his 1986 study Earth and other Ethics : The Case for
Moral Pluralism, Christopher Stone, who is Roy P.
Crocker Professor of Law at the University of Southern
California Law Center, presents another model of
nature. The Stone model has at least two rather direct
antecedents: first, his own metaphorical thinking published as a law review article in 1972 entitled "Should
Trees Have Standing? Towards Legal Reasoning for
Natural Objects" and, second, the "mapping" approach
to social values originally articulated by Professor
McHarg. While Professor Stone's "Trees" was cited
and amplified by Justice William 0. Douglas in his dissenting opinion in Sierra Club v. Morton, it took Stone
several years to build on his original conceptions, identity ethical variables, and formulate a model for what
he calls "moral pluralism." Reaction by others to his
moral pluralism model has added to the rigor and utility of his approach.
At its essence, Stone's model of moral pluralism
... conceives the realm of morals to be partitioned into
several planes. The planes are intellectual frameworks that

support the analysis and solution of particular moral problems, roughly in the way that algebra and geometry provide
frameworks for the problems to which they are respectively
suited" (Stone, 1986, 133 ff) .
Each plane is composed of two basic elements: "an
ontological commitment" or "a foundational judgment
as to which things are to be recognized and dealt with,"
as well as a "governance" aspect-the rules that apply.
Drawing on McHarg's work, Stone explains that
mapping the varying "versions of the world's salient
qualities" we can get hold of the many different, and
often competing, interests in a physical area. He
addresses the hypothetical problem of whether and
how an oil company should search for oil in the
Beaufort Sea, in an area close to whale migration
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routes, observing that "the search for oil in the
Beaufort Sea gives rise to several quandaries that
induce us to sort out relations among different sorts of
entities: contemporary persons, future generations,
whales, Indian tribes, corporate bodies, species, habitats, and on" (201). One seeking to apply Stone's
moral pluralism model to the ethical dilemma would
employ "moral maps." As Stone explains, these maps
consist of two major sets: "empirical maps" and "moral
reference maps." (The following summary is based on
Ethics, 202-240)
Empirical maps are subdivided, in turn, into two
typologies: (1) "natural features maps" and (2) "actioninfluence maps." The natural features map would seek
to display such things as whale migration, geophisical
properties of the ocean floor, tidal and wave structures,
temperature, and potential products. The second,
"action-influence maps" would seek to depict "each
area of proposed geophysical dynamiting present[ing]
a zone of risk" to whales. Stone's model, applied to the
whale/ oil drilling problem, then combines "the data
on these first two maps ...with biological analysis to display risk-to-whale probability configurations for each
developmental plan of varying intensity and precaution. The highest risks will be where zones of
maximum hazard overlay existing migration routes."
Stone's "moral reference maps" are subdivided
into two typologies: (1) "utility plane maps" and (2)
"nonutility plane maps." Utility plane maps, in turn,
consist of four kinds: (a) person preferences ("the utility to contemporary humans of all things subject to
influence under the alternative development plans");
(b) all sentient creature preferences (assuming "animals are morally significant on their own account, and
that, in principle, the way to account for them it
through their pleasures and pains"); (c) future
humans and spatially remote human preferences
(future human generations as well as existing, spatially
remote, humans in other parts of the world from the
proposed development project); and (d) "all temporarily (spatially) remote sentient creatures, human and
non-human combined."
Professor Stone's non-utility plane-maps consist of six kinds: (a) maps of "persons"; (b) maps of
"persons remote in time and space"; (c) maps depicting preferences of "non-human animals"; (d) maps of
"preferenceless and non-sentient entities" (like plants
or lichen); (e) maps of "membership entities" (like
species, nations, corporations, and cultures); and (f)
maps of worthy "qualities" (like life, courage, and beauty). Stone explains these "non-utility planes" as
attempts to depict "morally corrected preferences,"
instead of mere utility preferences. He notes:
The way in which we calculate utility may vary slightly,
domain to domain. But that aside, much of moral theory sup11

poses that there are certain things we ought not to do even if
the choice entails some sacrifice of (or, in a strong Kantian
form, irrespective oO the general welfare. The point here is
that as we pass across each of the same domains (of persons,
the temporarily and spatially remote, etc.), there is a mirror
governance for each, not anchored in utility at all. In each
case, the non-utility governance may deviate from the utilitydriven conclusion, forcing us to correct or displace entirely
the judgments we might arrive at on the utility planes.
In concluding his book, Professor Stone emphasizes that his model of moral pluralism is a technique
for renouncing "the commonly held Monist assumption that moral considerateness is a matter of
either/or." Rather, Stone contends that his model can
show that "it is not true that there is a single moral
property, for example, intelligence, sentience, or life,
such that entities are either morally relevant (in the
same way according to the same rules) or utterly
inconsiderate, out in the cold."
Professor Sallie McFague, in her 1987 book Models
of God: Theoluy for An Ecological, Nuclear Age, asserts that
it is indeed our models of God that may need re-shaping if we are to be better than mere survivors on the
planet. Specifically, McFague contends that "the judeaChristian tradition's triumphalist imagery for the
relationship between God and the world" cannot work
within the context of postmodern sensibility. She
points out in her preface
Any listing of these assumptions will vary but will probably include some of the following: a greater appreciation of
nature, linked with a chastened admiration for technology;
the recognition of the importance of language (and hence
interpretation and construction) in human existence; the
acceptance of the challenge that other religious options
present to the Judea-Christian tradition; a sense of the
displacement of the white, Western male and the rise of
those dispossessed because of gender, race, or class; an
apocalyptic sensibility, fueled in part by the awareness that
we exist between two holocausts, the Jewish and the nuclear;
and perhaps most significant, a growing appreciation of the
thoroughgoing, radical interdependence of life at all levels
and in every imaginable way. (ix)
For McFague, these basic shifts in assumptions
manifested in post-modern society "form the context
for theology if it is to be theology for our time" (ix). In
other words, a Judea-Christian member of the postmodem world must be ready to use a more powerfully
imaginative theology to link and reconcile these critical
variables. In essence, Professor McFague makes a plea
for more sophisticated metaphors and model-building
in the realms of theology and Christian faith.
Significantly, she asserts that though " theologians
have attempted to interpret the faith in new concepts
appropriate to our time, the basic metaphors and mod12

els have remained relatively constant: They are triumphalist, monarchical, patriarchal." Her critique
continues by asserting that "much deconstruction of the
traditional imagery has taken place, but little construction" (xi). (original emphases)
Accordingly, Professor McFague identifies what she
believes to be a crucial need in post-modern theology,
a "remythologizing of the relationship between God
and the world" by working with other models, encouraging us to think in terms of God as mother, lover, and
friend of the world, in addition to God as father, king,
ruler, or conqueror. The theology she calls for is, as
she says, "mostly fiction: It is the elaboration of key
metaphors and models. It insists that we do not know
very much and that we should not camouflage our
ignorance by either petrifying our metaphors or forgetting that our concepts derive from metaphors" (xi)
On close examination, McFague's way of thinking
about creation-on a continuum of model buildingis less precise and more impressionistic than the nature
models of McHarg and Stone. Her "metaphorical or
heuristic theology" is a model-seeking approach somewhere between merely hazy metaphors and more
systematic, integrated models. Indeed, her analysis
tends to support this interpretation at several points of
the text, particularly when she writes:
No longer is it possible to insist without question on the
'fixed canonic and binding' character of metaphors and the
concepts built upon them that have come to us 'after long
usage.' The constructive character of theology must be
acknowledged, and this becomes of critical importance when
the world in which we live is profoundly different from the
world in which many of the traditional metaphors and concepts gained currency. Theologians must think
experimentally, must risk novel constructions in order to be
theologians for our time. (6)
Moreover, McFague's discussion of the "organic
model" or "evolutionary ecological perspective," versus
the "mechanical model" or the "model of the
machine," while nuanced and thoughtful, omits several
details; these must presumably be worked out later.
She argues that the machine model, despite its efficacy
in the nineteenth century, fails to work as well today as
a more organic one. She would prefer a model which
reflects the world of "relationships and relativity, as
well as process and openness.... [The organic model]
is most appropriate to life, and hence qualities of lifeopenness, relationship, interdependence, change,
novelty, and even mystery-become the basic ones for
interpreting all reality" (10). And she urges theologians to be willing to take risks. "Since metaphors are
imaginative leaps across a distance-the best
metaphors always giving both a shock and a shock of
recognition-metaphorical theology will dare to take
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risks as well, for the recognition does not come without
a shock" (35).
To describe God with source material previously
outside religious tradition is justified because "our concept of God is precisely that-our concept of
God-and not God" (37). Accordingly, it is not sacrilegious, or presumptuous, in McFague's view, to
investigate other models of God's relationship with the
world and human beings. For her, the models of mother, lover, and friend, precisely because they come from
such deep levels of human experience, are "illuminating possibilities for expressing an inclusive,
nonhierarchical understanding of the gospel" (87).
Thus she expects that her image of the world as God's
body should lead us to better, more life-giving, more
restorative, more gospel-filled actions toward the world
as we seek to know how to behave in it.
Where does all this lead us? What are the benefits
as well as the risks of seeking to build better models of
creation? Are we up to the project? I see four problem
areas, and four significant possibilities for improvement.
The first problem involves the very nature of
knowing itself. In a famous piece of argument,
Immanuel Kant asserted that human knowledge of the
universe suffers from a pretension of realism. Though
he recognized the necessity of thinking through analogy, he vigorously denied that knowledge construed in
such a fashion could reach reality itself. Indeed, Kant
anticipated the scientific crisis of the early twentieth
century when scientists were forced to accept the relativity-and imperfection-of the two then-prevailing
classical theories of the physical universe: the wave theory and the particle theory of light.
The nature models of Stone and McHarg, as well
as the models of God sketched by McFague, can be criticized in Kantian terms. To a certain extent, these
models are nothing but subjective constructs in which
the model-maker unites his or her experience.
However, in partial defense, all three thinkers acknowledge the need and desirability for experimental praxis
to test and, if need be, revise the underlying models.
Notwithstanding the call for experimentation, how
can the models of McHarg, Stone, and McFague be
tested? It is one thing to test the Einsteinian model of
relativity by observing atomic particles in a nuclear
accelerator or bending light through a giant telescope.
But how can models of creation be satisfactorily tested?
Are not all human models of creation hopelessly
encumbered by rampant anthropocentrism, whether
or not the model acknowledges the independent
importance of God, on the one hand, or of nature on
the other?
A second difficulty involves a lack of precise termiOctober, 1990

nology. The McHarg, Stone and McFague models also
suffer from a lack of definitional precision. A model, as
an explicit premise of purported reality, "lacks precision if it does not set clear boundaries between what it
includes and what it excludes" (Schlag and Skover 13.
I borrow extensively from this text in my analysis of
these creation models.)
For example, does McFague's model of God as
"mother," "friend," and "lover" also contemplate overprotective mothers, two-faced friends, and jealous
lovers? Do the Stone and McHarg mapping models of
fine gradients of shading envision map readers who are
color blind or maladept at making fine distinctions? If
these models do not contemplate these relatively negative characteristics, as the implicit meaning of the
terms would indicate, do they thereby lose some of
their saliency, much as an econometric model of
national income is unrealistic to the extent it assumes
"perfect" competition?
Thirdly, to the extent that the creation models suffer from imprecise terminology, the conclusions
reached by using these models may be overinclusive or
underinclusive. For example, if the only acceptable reason for not developing a particular natural resource
(such as open terrain or the ocean's Continental Shelf)
is the weighing of competing evaluative judgments, the
McHarg and Stone models should accurately assess
future human values about nature and economic
growth. To the extent these models are unable to accurately assess and predict these values, then an outcome
that would halt a human development project for the
sake of natural values today may be too broad and,
therefore, overinclusive in the event that values of the
future put a premium on resource exploitation and
material affiuence.
Similarly, if the underlying justification of the
McFague model is that the "evolutionary, ecological
perspective" of "modern sensibility" involves a relational play of chance, process, change, transformation and
openness, then her conclusion that God should be
modeled on Mother, Friend and Lover is underinclusive. Her tripartite model may be attacked as
underinclusive because chance, process, change, transformation, and openness may also be characterized by
inherent evil as well as inherent good in the universe.
Biblical scholar Jon Levinson pointed this out, in a general way, in his book Creation and the Persistence of Evil:
The Jewish Drama of Divine Omnipotence. Writing from
the standpoint of the theology of the Hebrew Bible,
Levinson observes:
A false finality or definitiveness is ascribed to God's act
of creation, and, consequently, the fragility of the created
order and its vulnerability to chaos tend to be played down.
Or, to put the point differently, the formidability and
13

resilience of the forces counteracting creation are usually not
given their due, so that the drama of God's exercise of
omnipotence is lost, and a static idea of creation then
becomes the cornerstone of an overly optimistic understanding of the theology of the ... Bible. (xiii)
. A fourth problem concerns the unknowable implicat:lons of these models for other settings. Thus, while
the Stone and McHarg nature mapping models may be
acceptable when dealing with traditional development
projects in a stable geopolitical context, the models
may be undesirable in non-traditional scenarios. For
example, how would the model of oil exploration in
the Beaufort Sea factor in a state of conventional war
between the United States and another power, where
access to increased quantities of petroleum is in the
national interest? In this new context- a threat to
national security-the Stone and McHarg models
might be undesirable because they would hamper
attempts to fight the war and, therefore, save the political society. Similarly, McFague's models of God may
be satisfactory relational and interactive premises of
human-divine interfaces. However, the model may be
unsatisfactory if it were to be applied to unilateral
actions and workings of God. It is reasonable to
assume-and there is ample biblical support for the
proposition-that there are some things that God does
without regard to human beings. This comes down to
the mystery, the omnipotence, and the suzerainty of
God-a reality of the universe at least as plausible as
the McFague assumption of reality.
On the other hand, as Robert Browning wrote, a
"man's reach should exceed his grasp, or what's a heaven for?" Creation models like those of McFague,
Stone and McHarg reach out to understand and to
deal with matters that are inadequately understood. By
attempting to build models descriptive of diverse and
unpredictable forces, they are building something akin
to the recent models and theories of chaos being developed, with considerable promise, in the biological and
physical sciences. As such, they put human beings on
the high road: the road of inquiry, the road of deep
reflection about vitally important questions. This process--provided it can overcome the aforementioned
problems--is good and socially useful.
The creation models discussed in this essay, while
not without problems, are bottomed on trenchant,
penetrating and persuasive metaphors. There are many
convincing similarities between human evaluations of
the relative importance, or lack of importance, of sentient and non-sentient creatures, landscape forms, and
natural resources and the act of making and reading a
map. Similarly, the theological creation model of
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Professor McFague is strongly supported by biblical
text as well as modern socio-political realities. To the
extent that there are shortcomings in the models of
creation that these thinkers put forth, the shortcomings appear to be secondary, and inconsequential.
They help us to discover and to learn a more
sophisticated, complete, and synaptical version of the
ongoing dynamics of creation. While imperfect, and in
need of revision and correction in some instances, they
go b~yond a ~erely metaphorical sensibility. They
descnbe and sunulate key parameters. They bring clusters of metaphors together. They provide a feedback
loop for further insights.
The models of creation discussed in this essaywhile deeply concerned about transcendent matters of
non-human life and natural forces, of God and divine
providence-also serve to enhance the very best of
humanistic thought and values. Indeed, the models by
Stone, McHarg and McFague remind one of the game
of Magister Ludi, the Glass Bead Game discussed by the
German author Herman Hesse in his novel of that
name. Something like chess but far more intricate, the
Glass Bead Game is thought in its purest form: a grand
synthesis through which philosophy, art, music, and
scientific laws are appreciated simultaneously. The
challenge, and ultimate worth, of the creation models
by McHarg, Stone, and McFague is their potential to
be used and appreciated by a wider audience of
thoughtful people. A subject as vast and interconnected as creation deserves nothing less. 0
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The Nature of American Religion
Betty A. DeBerg

In 1988 the American Society of Church History
celebrated its centennial. One of the high points of the
event was an address by Catherine L. Albanese,
professor of religious studies at the University of
California, Santa Barbara. In her remarks she asked the
kind of question that keeps historians of American
religion going, that puts a spring into our steps, and
research ideas into our heads: Given the newness of
the United States as nation, and the diversity of its
native and immigrant subcultures, how long will we
wait for a recognizably American ethnos? "How many
centuries are needed to turn the manyness of
American immigrants into the oneness of a single
people? And if to the extent that would please a
geographer they became one people, what would their
national religion look like?"
The search for an American religion can be a bit
unsettling because it upsets the canons of much
"American church history" that has taken as its subject
matter the transplanting of various strands of
European Christianity and their subsequent
development into American denominations. Given
Albanese's vision and mission (should we choose to
accept it), students of American religion and culture
must expand their perimeters beyond traditional
denominational compartments, for the object of our
hunt is not those precious, carefully hoarded and
loudly proclaimed denominational differences and
points of uniqueness, but rather just what can be said
to be common among all. We must also leave behind
an exclusive concern with things European and
Christian because there are so many non-European
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and non-Christian religions and ethnic groups in the
American mix.
We will, on the basis of recent Gallup surveys, also
want to broaden our considerations beyond affiliations
that are self-consciously or conventionally "religious."
While Black denominations, mainline "moderate"
ones, and the Roman Catholic Church have lost
membership in the last 30 years, and both very liberal
and conservative Protestant denominations have
gained a bit, the fastest growing group on the
American religious scene is the "secular constituency,"
the "nonaffiliates." We cannot assume that these
nonaffiliates are uninterested in religion, or that they
do not hold religious beliefs or engage in religious
behavior. Many of these people "hold beliefs in the
supernatural and the mystical." They were described by
the conductors of the survey as "a 'new class' in
outlook and ideology." Albanese concluded that many
of the nonaffiliates are drawn in powerful ways to a
constellation of religious beliefs and practices
associated with New Age religion.
So we begin again with the question: What
religious sensibilities and behaviors do California
Buddhists, Black Muslims, Ecofeminists, Missouri
Synod Lutherans, Hispanic Roman Catholics, Reform
Jews, Scientologists, Free-will Baptists, Hard-shell
Baptists and Southern Baptists--US citizens all- have
in common? Are there common traits that can be
identified as embodiments of an American religion?
Historians and other social analysts have proposed
a number of interesting candidates for the American
religion. One of the most important and most obvious
is civil religion, or the cult of the nation. In the
American context, Robert N. Bellah first used the term
civil religion to name a set of discrete beliefs and
observable institutions and rituals that give symbolic
expression to the identity of Americans as Americans,
and to the meaning Americans give to the nation as a
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whole and their own particular role in it. For Bellah,
one such belief is that the United States is God's New
Israel, or in secular terms, America has a mission to
bring (either by being the shining-city-on-a-hill
example to all or by direct involvement in
international affairs) its goodness, justice, peace, and
democracy to the entire world. Ask randomly selected
members of any immigrant group why they or their
forebears came to the United States and one is likely to
hear that in this country one is free to pursue one's
dreams and fortune. America has been and is still
understood by many of its inhabitants as a land of
opportunity. Traditional American civil religious rituals
include presidential inaugurations, Fourth of July
celebrations, Thanksgiving Day feasts, and pledging
allegiance to the flag. The American civil religion is
preserved in and promulgated by a number of social
institutions: the public schools, the military and
veteran's organizations, Boy and Girl Scouts, TV
programming, as well as many religious organizations
and denominations. While Americans squabble over a
flag amendment and some seem to hold even the civil
religion's high priest (currently George Bush) in
derision, in the face of national disaster (war,
hurricane, death of a president in office, death of
astronauts) and triumph (the 1976 Bicentennial, the
landing of astronauts on the moon, the victory of the
US ice hockey team over the USSR team in the 1980
Winter Olympics) most of us discover deep ties of
national loyalty and often unspoken but just as often
surprisingly strong value associated with the country
and our place in it which can only be described as
religious.
Another phenomenon touted as a common
American religion is the religion of domesticity.
Historians such as Ann Douglas, Barbara Welter, and
Colleen McDannell are responsible for the currency of
this phrase and this particular analysis of American
religion and culture. The religion of domesticity is the
religion practiced within the family home and the
domestic conventions of the family home practiced
religiously. Like all forms of religion, this one has a
particular history and social context With the rise of
industrial capitalism and the solidification of an urban
middle class in the mid-nineteenth century, religion
(conventional religion such as Christianity) was
privatized, relegated to the "domestic sphere" of
women along with household management, childrearing, and philanthropy. Religious morality and
values, unwelcomed in the "public sphere" of men and
their business, political, and professional activities,
became the mainstay of family life and "feminized"
mainstream religious organizations. When we enter
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the world of American Christian domestic religion, we
enter a world of family devotions, home altars and
Bible stands, portraits of Jesus and crucifixes on living
room walls, family Bible camps and religious theme
parks, and mothers like Richard Nixon's who, he
claimed in an inaugural address, served as the prime
model for him of self-sacrificing devotion to God and
family.
A secular version of the religion of domesticity
has permeated the entire society from its source in
middle-class evangelical Protestant and Roman
Catholic circles. Jeff Blum, a friend of mine, calls the
secular version the Cleaver syndrome (named after
Ward, June, Wally, and the Beav rather than Eldridge).
While the power of this religious system may be fading,
most Americans feel some pressure to conform to this
model of family life. Until only recently the mass
media promoted it to the exclusion of all others, and
social welfare and public assistance policies enforced it.
Still today the bridal wear and home construction
industries make their fortunes off it, and participation
in it is practically a prerequisite for public office. The
deep sense of identity and meaning (as spouse, parent,
man, woman, child, breadwinner, homemaker)
fostered by American domesticity is nothing short of
religious. It shapes our lives in profound ways and
locates us within a community of import and meaning
that transcends the individual.
Another candidate for the religion of America is a
corollary of domestic religion. I call it the religion of
the corporation. While the religion of domesticity
traditionally functioned most powerfully for women,
the religion of the corporation gave and gives
American men, especially, much of their identity and
meaning. This religious system, too, has its origins in
the gendered division of labor and influence that
resulted from the rise of corporate industrial
capitalism a century ago. These vast changes in the
social and political landscape were matched in the
religious culture. A Swede, Rolf Lunden, has done the
best study I know of the origins of the religion of the
corporation in the United States. He documented a
dominant cultural strand in which the values and
methods of the corporation were sacralized and
propagated as the best that America and religion had
to offer. The public media began to reconstruct the
cultural myth of origin: business, because it dealt with
the fundamental necessities of life, predates other
cultural forms (e.g., religion, science; jurisprudence)
and is, hence, the very basis of social life and cultural
achievement. Skyscrapers, business suits, and the
Model-T became the key symbols of American identity
at home and abroad. Business leaders became the
towering new American heroes. The new anti-hero-the socialist, the Bolshevik, the Wobblie-personified
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all that the capitalists feared. These new corporate
religious values, symbols and mythology have their
institutionalized form, outside business enterprises
themselves of course, in the business and civic clubs
such as Rotary and Kiwanis, once exclusively men's
clubs, which proliferated after 1910. (Women were
given a role of their own as consumers after 1920 or so,
and now are allowed in increasing numbers into the
sacred space of stock exchange and executive office
suites.)
Further, American religious organizations
(churches, synagogues, sectarian groups) were at the
same time remodeled along corporate lines. Toward
the end of the last century, churches began eagerly to
endorse business values, evangelize businessmen, and
defend personal property and profits made from it as
good stewardship. Today, too, churches and other
conventional religious organizations hire business
managers, expect religious leaders to function as
executives, and borrow a full range of advertising and
public relations strategies from corporate America. I
do not believe that this time-honored American
religious tradition is waning. One need only look at
business school enrollments, the sales figures for Lee
Iaccoca's autobiography, the allure of Donald Trump
and big illegal drug money, and the corporatization of
health care, the PTL Club, higher education, and
funerals to catch a glimpse as it goes by of this deep
and wide stream in American religious culture. To the
extent that Americans are what they do (for a living),
the values and mores of corporate America are religious
in every sense of the word. And unemployment is a
spiritual as well as an economic scourge.
The last option for America's religion that I will
present, and the one of which I will give the fullest
description, is nature religion. This strand of
American religious culture seems the least obvious to
many, and gets insufficient attention from scholars in
my field. The work of two historians are essential for
understanding this religious tradition. The first is
Catherine L. Albanese, with whose centennial address I
began this essay, and the second is another historian at
the University of California, Santa Barbara, Roderick
Frazier Nash. Each traces the cultural descent of one
of two distinguishable forms of contemporary nature
religion in the United States. Both recognize, however,
the indelible stamp placed on the world view of
Americans by the sheer vastness of United States
territory and the variety and beauty of its natural
wonders.
Albanese is primarily interested in the evolution
and contemporary popularity of religious sentiments
and groups loosely categorized as New Age. She
located the emergence of a mystical reverence for the
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natural world and its processes primarily in the
Romanticism of the 1830s, particularly the
Transcendentalists Ralph Waldo Emerson and Henry
David Thoreau and their ambivalence about the
industrial revolution. In Emerson's Nature are two
themes that emerge again and again in popular nature
religion: a correspondence between nature, humanity,
and God; and the presence of the divine, or at least the
image of the divine, in nature itself. The sensibilities
of the Transcendentalists were institutionalized in
nature communes such as Brookfarm and Fruitlands.
In the mid-nineteenth century, nature mysticism was
taken from town to town by Lyceum speakers, many of
them "animal magnetizers" (hypnotists) who claimed
to break down within individuals any blockages
interfering with the free flow of the universal energy
that flowed in and through the entire world. The
nineteenth century was a great age of natural
medicine. Euro-Americans discovered the natural
healing methods of Native American societies.
Chiropractic, osteopathy, and homeopathic medicine
became widespread alternatives to the intrusive and
often brutal treatment by physicians. A major new
religious sect, Christian Science, whose Mother Church
is located in Boston, the city of the Transcendentalists,
rejected standard forms of medical care. Seventh Day
Adventists, Mormons, and various vegetarian groups
promoted reforms in eating habits. (Graham crackers
and breakfast cereal are part of that legacy: Sylvester
Graham was a well-known health reformer, and the
Kelloggs of Battle Creek, Michigan, were Adventists.)
A century ago, interest in the health of the
individual was matched by interest in the health of the
nation. With the closure of the frontier in the 1880s,
and the rapid growth of problems associated with
industrialized economy and urban living conditions,
many began to yearn for the country's wilderness days
and ways as a cure for its social ills. Would America
without its wilderness be like Samson without his hair?
Such concerns motivated the national parks
movement In 1872, Ulysses S. Grant signed the bill
which set aside Yellowstone National Park. In 1892,
John Muir founded the Sierra Club to explore and
protect western wilderness areas. Scouting, camping,
and hunting organizations got their start in the early
years of this century, their purpose to strengthen the
character of individuals, and hence of the country, by
exposing them to the purity and challenge of the
wilderness. Edgar Rice Burroughs provided an
appropriate new hero of the untamed wilds; he
published Tarzan of the Apes in 1914.
An important forebear of the holistic
environmental movement of today, a mainstay in New
Age perception and thought, was the rise of the
science of ecology. Pioneers in the field such as Henry
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C. Cowles, a University of Chicago scientist who in the
1890s studied the south shore dunelands of Lake
Michigan, gave scientific underpinnings to the mystical
sense of the unity and interconnection of all creation.
The contemporary New Age movement exhibits all
of these characteristics and more. Institutionalized in
channeling groups, nature sounds cassettes, book and
crystal stores, nontraditional mental and physical
health care centers, astrologers and other practitioners
of occult arts and nature mysticism, syncretistic East
Asian religious communities, vegetarian and nudist
communes, human potential and prosperity
evangelists, and magazines such as Mother Earth News,
the New Age camp of American nature religion
emphasizes cosmic unity, the spiritual quality of people
and nature, the presence of the divine in the world,
the ability to access the divine under certain
circumstances, and the participation of people in the
ongoing creative, healing, and transformational
processes of the cosmos. These concerns have left
their mark on many regions of American culture, and
many individuals who identify primarily with
conventional religious organizations have chosen for
themselves certain of these beliefs and behaviors, from
reading horoscopes to taking wilderness retreats to
giving up red meat. Words like ecology, holistic, and
Gaia are common parlance in many parts of the
American cultural landscape. But the New Age is not
such a newcomer to the religious scene; mystical
nature religion is a powerful and dynamic tradition in
our culture.
The second major form of nature religion is the
animal rights movement. Nash is most interested in
this particular part of the picture. He argues that
contemporary concerns such as forest and wetlands
preservation, the welfare of marine mammals, and the
agitation against the use of animals in scientific and
industrial experimentation have their roots in the very
foundation of American social, political, philosophical
and religious identity: the natural rights philosophy of
the European Enlightenment as refracted through the
U.S. Declaration of Independence and the Bill of
Rights. Just as movements for abolition of slavery and
woman suffrage were hard-fought but successful
attempts in the nineteenth century to enlarge the
ethical community beyond white males, so is the
animal rights movement today an attempt to expand
our notions of community even further to include
nonhuman animal life and, for a growing number of
activists, plant life and inorganic matter as well.
The animal rights agenda, too, has a long history
in this country. It was popularized by the humane
movement (Societies for the Prevention of Cruelty to
Animals) immediately after the Civil War. There are
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telling similarities between the abolition and animal
rights movements. Besides the use of natural rights
rationale, both were emotionalized in campaigns for
public support. Nash called the novel Black Beauty the
Uncle Tom's Cabin of the horse. And one thinks now of
the use by animal rights activists of color photographs
of cute baby seals and the lurid descriptions and
bloody pictures of their slaughter by fur traders today.
In any case, the move from abolition to animal rights
work seemed like a consistent and natural one for
Harriet Beecher Stowe, who joined the humane
movement after the emancipation of the slaves.
Other factors in nineteenth-century culture
contributed as well. Darwinian theory proved
compatible to some in the animal rights movement
with its claims that humanity arose from and is still an
integral part of the animal kingdom. The ecological
sciences reinforced the sense of the unity and value of
all creatures. Henry S. Salt, responsible in large part
for the popularizing of Thoreau and Walden Pond,
published in 1892 a pamphlet entitled "Animals'
Rights," and gave the movement its name. Now, nearly
a century later, animal rights has emerged as a hotly
contested issue, with many zealously devoted to the
crusade to protect animals, plants, rivers, and
mountains from human interference and destruction.
Convinced, and taking their case to the public, that a
whale, or a redwood tree, or a wolf is as valuable and
has the same inalienable rights as does a human,
animal rights activists are turning to more aggressive,
sometimes violent means to act morally within the
world as they perceive it. These activists do not
constitute a mainstream, but their sensibilities are
rampant. The mass media devoted considerable air
time to the fate of two whales trapped in the ice off
Alaska several years ago; the fishing industry was forced
to change its techniques and to sell "dolphin safe"
canned tuna; sales of fur coats have dropped
dramatically; even on commercial television, nature
programs are regularly aired; and, at least in urban
areas, vegetarian restaurants abound. If Nash is
correct is his assessment that the animal rights
movement is simply the next wave of natural rights
liberalism, and I suspect that he is, then he has
identified a religious movement of great power and
relatively undiluted American lineage.
In closing, let me make one brief comment on my
perceptions of the relevance of Lutheran theology and
culture to this discussion. While I think that there are
parts of Luther's theological and exegetical corpus that
can be mustered in support of various kinds of
environmental ethics and reform activities, use of
traditional Lutheran materials in this way is really a
rear-guard maneuver to give a Lutheran appearance
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and pedigree to religious sensibilities and trends
welling up from within the larger American culture
(which knows and cares little or nothing about Luther
and Lutheranism) and already adopted or annexed,
consciously or unconsciously, happily or grudgingly, by
many Lutheran individuals, congregations, and
bureaucratic organizations. I say this to demean
neither The Cresset Colloquium's assignment, American
Lutherans, nor American nature religion. I only want
to adjust our perspective a bit away from
denominationalism, which disallows a good view of the
whole, belies the American character of American
Lutheranism, and exaggerates denominational
uniqueness, toward a broader historical and cultural
perspective when we think about religion in the United
States, be it Lutheranism, Pentecostalism, peyote
religion, or the Unification Church. While religious
interests, beliefs, rituals, and organizational structures
in this country vary widely and will always do so, any
living, compelling part of the American religion
mosaic will of necessity embody in significant ways one
or, more likely, all of the forms of cultural religion I
have sketched so briefly above. Whether Lutherans like
it or not, it is the American way. 0
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The Friends of Christ
The stones cried out
When Christ went pastTheir gravel voices
Stiff with fear
And pain that only he could hear.
The sea grew hard
When Christ walked out.
He found the waves' solidity.
He sensed their strength
Beneath his heels.
He felt what others could not feel.
He laid his hands upon the stones
And healed them ofrigidity.
He spoke some kind words
And calmed the sea.
The mountains moved
When Christ cried out.
They trembled when
They heard him moan.
They did not let him die alone.

Barbara Bazyn
October, 1990
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The Hating of
America
Reno Juneja
We Americans have been distressed and puzzled by the recent
events in the Middle East. One
aspect of this distress has little to do
with the fear of recession due to rising oil prices or even the fear of loss
of American lives in the event of a
war with Iraq. What unnerves many
of us, I think, is the vilifying of the
United States , the mass hatred
directed at us in protest rallies not
only on the streets of Iraq, where
they are to be expected, but also in
the neighboring Arab states like Jordan. We want to believe that these
are media events orchestrated by
politicians and to some extent they
are.
And yet the gnawing fact is that
they are not entirely media events.
When we look at the faces qrought
home to us on our television
screens, or read about these rallies
in news magazines, or talk to people

Renu Juneja teaches in the Department
of English at VU and regularly unites a
Nation column. She is currently
engaged in a study of colonial literatures, following a sabbatical in
Trinidad.
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with first hand knowledge of the
people and the places where such
events take place, then we are left
with the frightening realization that
often the hate is palpable and real,
not just the manufactured emotion
of political propaganda. And this
for most of us well-meaning Americans, liking ourselves and so
desirous that others like us too, is
like a blow to the stomach.
It's puzzling isn't it? We supported Iraq all through its war with
Iran. This may have been motivated
by our greed for Iraqi oil. But some
of this eagerness to support Iraq
had to do with our pleasure at finding someone else hating our
enemy-especially that enemy
which had directed such a frightening degree of hate at us. I suppose
our pleasure at discrediting those
who hated us so violently must have
led us to ignore Sad dam Hussein's
inhumanity. How is it then that we
have once again become the Great
Satan for Iraqis and for others we
feel we have never harmed? Why
should we be haunted by memories
of similar mass gatherings in Central
and South America and in South
East Asia where people have assembled in the past to vent a collective
hatred for the United States? These
are often people we have aided

through money, development assistance, and sale or gift of arms.
The United States has never
been a bully on the scale of Soviet
Russia. We Americans are, on the
whole, a warm, easygoing, caring
sort of people. Sometimes we are
not fully sensitive to different viewpoints but others have been more
guilty of arrogance. We have, we
feel, tried not to be the ugly Americans. When we ordinary folk travel
we seem to be genuinely liked.
When we live among others we are
usually welcomed and accepted.
People seem really to desire our way
of life and endorse our ideals. Why
then these eruptions of collective
hate?
As an erstwhile colonial who has
herself had a love-hate relationship
with the colonizer, I want to venture
an explanation. This inexplicable,
seemingly unmotivated resentment
of America is a response to a special
brand of new colonialism for which
America is perhaps an appropriate
symbol. America is a colonizer not
by virtue of its force, although its
superpower status does make its
apotheosis into a bully rather convenient. America is a colonizer by
virtue of its hidden control of
economies of developing nations
through American multinationals,
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but this is not the special brand of
colonialism I have in mind. This
new kind of colonialism America
has achieved by virtue of its increasing influence on the psyches of
ordinary people of other nations.
For the non-western world, America
is now an abstraction symbolizing
the powerful ideology of modernity
and all the conquering technology
of the west. To us it may seem
unfair that America alone draws the
resentment the rest of the world
feels towards the cultural imperialism of the west-until we remember
that to a great extent even the rest
of the west has been colonized by
America in terms of food, clothing,
cinema, television, and music.
America is feared less as a bully
outside but more as the bully inside,
altering the structures of the mind,
altering, that is, the cultural priorities of other nations. What passes as
development or progress or education does often involve the
destruction of the existing identity
of a people. In this process, psyches
become unmoored. When progress
and education also imply the inferiority of the existing culture, the
sense of identity of a people is not
only dislocated, it is also wounded.
The ethicist Dr. William May, in his
talk at Valparaiso University's Faculty Seminar, distinguished between
guilt and shame. Guilt comes from
misuse of power, from doing wrong
and causing pain. Shame comes
from feeling pain, from a sense of
lacking power. Shame involves a
diminishing of self and hence it
touches deeper issues of identity. I
would like to use this distinction to
probe the response of the non-western world, particularly the Arab
world, to America. The colonizers, if
they feel responsible for any unworthy deeds, feel primarily guilt But
the colonized feel shame. The honor of the colonized nation has been
wounded, or is perceived as having
been wounded. And if, as with the
Islamic Middle East, these are masOctober, 1990

culine cultures with deep rooted
concepts of honor, then these people, like men of honor who value
honor more than life, are willing to
restore their honor at what seem to
the 'objective' and 'rational' observer to be absurdly high costs. They
may maim themselves, ruin their
economy, sacrifice millions of lives
in order to 'restore' their honor. So
for taking on America, Saddam Hussein does become a hero to these
people, even to those who are likely
to be very heavily burdened by the
consequences of his defiance of the
powerful west
Should America (as a symbol of
the west) really be viewed as a colonizer of the mind? In the past forty
years, even remote corners of the
globe have been transformed by the
impact of western technology, a
transformation, one could argue, far
greater than that experienced by
the colonized during the heyday of
European imperialism. The impact
of the British on the traditional lives
of most Indians, for instance, was
relatively minor compared to the
impact of western technology and
western values embodied by this
technology now hosted by Indians
since independence. The Arab
world is no different. Christopher
Dickey's recent book, The Expats:
Travels in Arabia, From Tripoli to
Tehran, reminds us of the difference
between the old and the new Arabia. Mr. Dickey tells us that he was
motivated to travel to Arabia by the
writings of Wilfred Thesiger. Thesiger's Arabia of forty years ago was
a land of silence "where only the
winds played." It was a land where
people lived out lives patterned by
traditional notions of hospitality,
graciousness, and civility, this last
most often exercised in leisurely
conversations. The people Thesiger
describes "did not live out their lives
secondhand, dependent on cinemas
and wireless." The Arabia Mr. Dickey finds, however, is a land
transformed by oil wealth and mod-

ern technology: " a land ... that
blends the convenient and the exotic like a raj rooted in suburbia and
silicon valley." He describes the new
Dubai with its Tex-Mex restaurants,
a new Dubai that a relative of mine
gushed about on her return from a
recent vacation because it had
American style grocery stores full of
American goods she has no access to
in India.
But even India's attempts to
restrict the import of American consumer goods in order to encourage
native manufacture ( a policy that is
earning it threats of trade penalties
by the US) has hardly stemmed the
tide of American influence.
McDonalds may not have yet
entered India, but hamburgers and
pizzas remain popular fare with the
middle class. Wrangler jeans entice
young girls away from sarees, and
Indian movies (the most powerful
vehicle of acculturation of the masses) are full of young people wearing
western clothes, dancing and
singing to the rhythms of rock
music, and imitating the west in
manners and ideas. Let me quote
from a recent article from India
Today, a popular news magazine.
"Rockets whizz into the air and
explode in a thousand colorful fragments. Mickey Mouse and Donald
Duck trundle past followed by a host
of shrieking fans. Robin Hood
greets King Arthur while Friar Tuck
stands on the side." Is the magazine
describing a theme park in America? No, these are descriptions of
birthday parties organized by the
rich in Delhi for their children. I am
not surprised by the outrageous
expense of these events (the costs
equal the income of a reasonably
well-to- do household for a year)
although I am a little sickened. But
I imagine the feudal princes
behaved no differently. What surprises me is that none of the parties
described in the article has an Indian theme.
It is against the backdrop of this
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kind of colonization that Islamic
mullahs (and their equivalents in
other cultures) have flourished in
their call to denounce America as a
corrupter of values. In Islamic
countries where there is such an
overlap between religion and
nationhood as also between religion
and culture, religious fundamentalism is a means of purifYing oneself,
of throwing off the corrupting alien
influence. It is a means of aggressively affirming identity and
asserting pride. And one aspect of
this reaffirmation of self and identity is hatred of America. In the
writing of Arab writers Peter Theroux
has noted a curious phenomenon, a
phenomenon I find particularly significant since the writers are the
articulators and self-conscious
shapers of any culture's sense of
identity. I quote Theroux: "The
absence of Americans from Arab
novels is an intriguing example of
the presence of absence, explicable,
perhaps, in terms of the constant
nagging presence of American food,
appliances, music, and politics even
in the remotest Arab town or oasis;
when the Arab novelist sits down to
write, he shuts it all out." (Sandstorms: Days and Nights in Arabia ) .
"In the animal kingdom," writes
Thomas Szasz (The Second Sin), "the
rule is eat or be eaten; in the human
kingdom define or be defined."
Because they fear being defined by
others, those subject to new forms
of colonization set out to aggressive-
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ly define themselves. Cultural
anthropologists and sociologists tell
us that cultures usually define themselves through encounters with
others, often as against that other.
Edward Said has argued in Orientalism that it was against the other
imagined as the oriental that the
western world defined itself. Now it
is against the west, of which America
is a convenient but appropriate symbol, that the 'orientals' are defming
themselves. Of course, the America
imagined by these other cultures is
itself a product of their imagination.
Our virtues are often defined in
opposition to the 'vices' of the other. If we are God's children then
the other must be the devil, the
Great Satan. And because this imagined other is an abstraction usually
far removed from the complex reality, it is still possible to continue
loving the discrete individuals who
compose that other.
Since most of those who express
hatred for America belong to the
economic or technological havenots of the world, it is tempting to
dismiss the ire as envy. I have tried
to suggest a different genesis for
these feelings. I do not wish to suggest, however, that such hatred for
the other is a necessary component
of the process of self-definition,
even in the vitiated relationship
between the colonizer and the colonized. There could be and indeed
there are more productive ways for a
people to affirm itself. Under the

influence of Gandhi, for instance,
India avoided the trap of hating the
colonizer. Not a naive idealist,
Gandhi's affirmation of lndianness
was always a double-edged sword.
To dress Indian asserted the dignity
and value of Indian culture and it
undermined the economic exploitation caused by imposition of British
textiles on India. But he never saw
Britain as out of reach of God's
grace. Sociologists have argued that
societies which have evolved cultures capable of living with
ambiguities are less prone to the
need of affirming their own identity
through rejecting the other. We
hope that we Americans have
achieved this ability as perhaps has
India, despite the sporadic outbreaks of religious and ethnic
chauvinism. I sometimes think that
the reverse side of the passivity and
'effeminacy' of Hinduism is its enormous tolerance for contradictions
and oppositions. Nor is Islamic culture
monolithic
either
in
geographic or cultural terms. Islamic Spain was more tolerant of
diversity than Christian Europe.
Cultures are, after all, the confluence of contingent histories. An
anonymous writer of one the
ancient Upanishads said it thus: "He
who sees every being in his own self
and sees himself in every other
being, he, because of this vision,
abhors nothing." 0
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Free Will
and Determinism
at the Movies
Norbert Samuelson
Other than their current availability in video stores, what do the
films The Adventures of Baron Munchausen, Do The Right Thing, and
Crimes and Misdemeanors have in
common? My answer is that each
uses comedy to describe how individuals affect what happens to them
and their fellow human beings, and
the limitations or restrictions on this
influence. (Since none of these
movies is new, some knowledge of
their plots and milieu will be
assumed.)
Set during a time that wegenerally call without blushing the Age of
Reason, The Adventures of Baron
Munchausen focuses on the siege of
an unnamed coastal European city
by a Turkish Sultan. To the central
question: why did the Sultan attack
the city and what can the city do to
save itself? two answers are given.
The first comes from Sir Horatio
Jackson, the second from Heronymous Karl Frederick Baron von
Munchausen.
The former is identified as the
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voice of realism; the latter as the
advocate of fantasy. The film sides
with fantasy. Jackson thinks that the
war is caused by conventional greed,
(a rational cause for war) and the
solution is thus to follow ordinary
rules. However, the truth is nearer
to the Baron's assertion that war is
both caused by and solvable
through extraordinary (i.e., fantastic) human behavior.
Jackson is a public servant in
the tradition of Robespierre. More
than a republican zealot, he is a
stereotype of the composite voice of
the entire, secular humanist tradition, from Rousseau and Locke
through Hegel and Marx. In short,
he is the pure and simple believer in
reason. Everything that does happen has a rational explanation and
solution. Furthermore, everything
that should happen should reflect
the universal laws of reason, i.e., be
common to all humanity and in
accord with prescribed rules. Jackson interprets "to be common to all
humanity" to mean, "unexceptional." Hence, Jackson executes a war
hero at the beginning of the film,
precisely because he was a hero, i.e.,
exceptional, and, as such, a bad
object lesson to the rest of the
troops.
The same motive underlies his

attempt to kill the Baron, who is,
above all, an exceptional human
being. Similarly, Jackson interprets
"in accord with prescribed rules" to
mean, "independent of any consequences to human beings." Hence,
for Jackson, all that matters in the
war is that the rules are followed. In
short, Jackson is a parody on the
ethics of Immanual Kant's teaching
that ethics are determined by pure,
a priori rules independent of all
experience and are intentionally
blind to all consequences for
human beings. The film's implicit
charge is that Jackson is the kind of
man inevitably produced by this
kind of ethics: a bureaucrat, a man
so bound by rules that experience
no longer matters. Jackson's solution, when experience defies
rational conception, is to outlaw the
experience rather than to find new
laws.
The Baron is an epic hero in
the tradition of Homerian tales. In
fact, the film's story is an odyssey, as
the Baron undergoes multiple
adventures in pursuit of his extraordinary friends. He sails to the
moon, romances its queen and
escapes the king's jealousy in order
to fmd Bertold. Next, he enters the
volcano of Mt. Edna, romances
Venus and escapes her husband,
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Vulcan's jealousy in order to find
Albrecht. Finally, he is swallowed by
a South Sea sea-monster in order to
find Gustavus and Adolphus. As
Odysseus' voyage culminates in a
heroic battle, so Baron Munchausen's adventure culminates in a
long and complicated battle
sequence. In short, the screen play
of Terry Gilliam and Charles McKeown asserts that there are heroes
whose extraordinary abilities give
human beings control of their universe. Hence, it is fantasy that best
describes reality. In the end, life is
what we make of it. Our control of
our fate is limited solely by our lack
of talent, the most important ones
being courage and imagination. As
such, this film, while appearing to
critique the ideals of the age of reason, fundamentally advocates its
individualistic, humanist ethics.

If Munchausen is the thesis, Do
The Right Thing is our antithesis.
Gilliam's movie suggests that human
beings can determine their fate;
Spike Lee's film argues that they
cannot. As Munchausen focused on
a war in which Turks besiege a classical European city, Do The Right
Thing focuses on a different kind of
war, where Blacks and Puerto Ricans
burn down an Italian pizzeria in the
Bedford- Styvesant area of contemporary New York City. Lee's film is
set on a day when the temperature
is more than 100°F and there is a
water shortage, with characters who
include middle-aged and young
Blacks, Puerto Ricans, Italians, and
Koreans. Besides the pizzeria, the
only other businesses that we see is a
Korean-owned, "Ma-and-Pa" grocery I convenience store, and a
Black-owned push cart selling flavored ice shavings. The Black
establishment leaders are the socalled Mayor, Mother Sister, and a
discjockey called Love Daddy who
"plays platters that matter" on the
neighborhood radio station, We
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Love FM 108. Of all the music
played, the dominant song "that
matters" is Public Enemy's "Fight
the Power." On the face of it, burning down the store fought the
power. The burning questions
though, are who is the "power" ?
and does it really "matter"?
Lee carefully lays out the causes
of the riot, and all of them can be
described as being outside anyone's
control. None of them, however, is
in itself a sufficient and necessary
cause, for chance also makes its contribution. What happens happens
for other reasons, if, in fact, there
are any reasons for what happens.
The Mayor and Mookie are the
heroes; like the Baron, they are
leaders who could (if anyone could)
affect the outcome of the war. They
can do something, but, unlike the
Baron, they cannot do much, and it
is not clear that what they can do
matters. The mayor can save a child
from being hit by a car, but he cannot make his mother stop abusing
him. Nor could the mayor feed his
own children. In other words, he
can save lives, but he cannot affect
their quality. We are presented with
carefully chosen messages from Martin Luther King that violence "as a
way of achieving racial justice is both
impractical and immoral..." and
from Malcolm: "I think there are
plenty of good people in America,
but there are plenty of bad people
in America, and the bad ones are
the ones who seem to have all the
power... .it doesn't mean that I advocate violence, but at the same time I
am not against using violence in selfdefense ... I call it intelligence."
However, no hero's advice
seems to offer any solution. King is
right that violence doesn't work,
but the riot wasn't really about racial
justice, and it was not a rational act
on anyone's part, but merely an
instinctual release of tension. The
good that the Mayor and Mookie
perform is equally instinctual, as the
Mayor says, "I wasn',t a hero; I just

seen what was happening and I
reacted; didn't even think." In the
situation documented by the movie,
Malcolm's advice is equally unhelpful, for self-defense was an
irrelevancy. In fact, the best use of
self-defense was that of the Korean,
not because he was swinging a
broom at the angry crowd of blacks,
but because his assertion of oneness
with them was so absurd that the
humor of it dissipated their anger.
From the perspective of Lee's
film, what is the answer to the question of adequate ethical framework
for action? The one implicit answer
is, as it is for Aristotelian ethics,
good character. Mookie and the
Mayor act the way they do not
because they deliberate, but because
they are the kinds of people that
they are. They cannot win a war, or
at least they cannot prevent a riot,
but they can minimize its damage
when they "do the right thing."
Whereas the first film focused
on individuals in states and the second in smaller community, Woody
Allen's film focuses on them in families. Judah Rosenthal, an eminent
and successful Jewish ophthalmologist, is a religious sceptic, but retains
a "spark" of his religious upbringing. He has had an affair for the
past two years with Dolores, an airline stewardess, who now threatens
to ruin his marriage of twenty five
years to Miriam and to destroy his
reputation and business by revealing
that he illegally borrowed money
from one of his charities. After
much soul-searching, he allows his
brother Jack to have her murdered.
To his utter chagrin, Judah not only
gets away with the murder, but he
discovers that he can overcome the
guilt and continue to lead a successful, happy life.
The story also contains a number of parallel subplots involving
characters loosely connected to
Judah: the saintly Rabbi Ben, who,
in spite of his moral excellence and
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in spite of his moral excellence and
Judah's treatment, goes blind;
Ben's sister Wendy and their brother Lester; the assorted partners of
these siblings. Wendy is about to
divorce Clifford Stern who is competing (unsuccessfully) with Lester
for the affection of Holly Reed, an
associate 1V producer whose interest in Cliff is primarily in Cliff's
documentary about a Holocaust survivor, Louis Levy, who subsequently
commits suicide. Both Lester and
Cliff are film makers, though the
implicit assumption (which we
receive primarily through Cliff's
eyes) is that Lester is shallow and
successful while Cliff is deep and a
failure.
Eyes play a central role in both
.the fUm's story line and its symbolism. Judah, morally blind, is an eye
doctor in whose office hangs a
painting of two people whose faces
have no features. In contrast, Ben,
who has moral vision, goes blind.
Judah frequently quotes his father,
Sol's lesson: "The eyes of God are
on us always," though he never really understands it. He thinks it means
that "the righteous are rewarded
and the wicked punished." He notes
that when he looked into the murdered Del's eyes, he saw nothing
behind them; all he saw was 'a black
void.' In the end, because Judah
does not understand, he rejects his
father's lesson. Judah's communist
Aunt May told her brother Sol to
open his eyes, that might makes
right. However, even she sees more
than Judah. She says, "For those
who want morality, there is morality"
and notes that her brother's faith in
moral order is "a gift." Sol notes that
he prefers God to truth, and comments that even if his faith were
wrong, he would still have 'a better
life' for that faith. Judah thinks that
this means more happiness and success, but Sol means 'better' in a
moral sense. The implication is that
Sol knows what Ben knows, and that
ideals cannot be falsified by mere
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events in this world. The film ends
not with the moral despair of Judah
and Cliff, but with the blind Ben
dancing with his just-married daughter to the music of "I'll Be Seeing
You."
Two views of divine providence
seem to dominate the film. One is
Judah's: the world is moral in that
the good are rewarded and the evil
punished. The other is Cliff's: the
world is immoral in that the good
are punished and the evil prosper.
The story line itself suggests that
both are wrong. At the descriptive
level the world is non-moral, since
there is no correlation whatsoever
(either direct or indirect) between
morality and success. However, that
does not mean that morality is
futile. On the contrary, morality is
something that human beings create, project on the universe, and, in
so doing, create reality. The spokespeople for this view are Professor
Levy, Rabbi Ben and Judah's father.
A sharp contrast is drawn
between the amoral world of experience and the divine/human world
of morality. The former is a world
without love and forgiveness,
because these are both part of the
God/human co-creation of the
moral order. Those who, because
they lack both, have never known
either, think that the world of experience is reality, but those who have
had the good fortune to be touched
in their youth by moral persons have
the strength and 'vision' of character to know that the ideal is the real.
Cliff thinks that movies are unreal,
because they reflect morality, but,
throughout the film, events from
the experienced world are paralleled by movies, that is, by human
creations that project order on the
apparently haphazard events of
human interaction. The reward for
virtue is more virtue, and the punishment for sin is more sin. Hence,
the "misdemeanors" of borrowing
money illegally and having an affair
lead Judah to the "crime" of mur-

der. In Judah's own words, at first
he did "a foolish thing, senseless,
vain, dumb," and his "one sin leads
to a deeper sin." Feeling guilt,
Judah tells Ben that "after two years
of shameful deceit ... I awakened as
if from a dream." Ben tells him,
"It's called wisdom. It comes to
some suddenly. We realize the difference between what is real and
deep and everlasting, versus the
superficial pay off of the moment."
Ben loses the ability to see "the
superficial," but grows in his ability
to see "what is real and deep and
everlasting." Judah is blind to this
moral reality. He sacrifices long
term gain for short term advantage.
Ben's advice to Judah to tell Miriam
the truth about his affair and thus
move together to a deeper life is
unheard, as instead, Judah has
Dolores murdered, and in so doing
preserves the static superficiality of
his marriage.
If The Adventures of Baron Munchausen is the thesis, and Do The
Right Thing is the antithesis, then
Cri7TU!s and Misdemeanors is the synthesis. If the conceptual framework
of Gilliam's film is modern, and
Lee's is contemporary, the implicit
ethics in Allen's film is post-modern.
Gilliam tells us that exceptional people can affect the moral quality of
the world, and Lee tells us that what
matters is innate virtue. Crimes
accepts both claims, and expresses a
richer conceptual framework in
which this apparent contradiction
becomes coherent. The underlying
schema of Munchausen is both
humanist and romantic, for good
and evil are defined in terms of
maximizing human pleasure and
minimizing human suffering, while
emphasizing the richness of human
imagination over and against the
narrow perspective of conven tiona!
human intellect. The underlying
schema of Right Thing is Aristotelian. Pleasure and pain have
more to do with human fortune
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than with human deliberation, and
ethics have more to do with character than action. In contrast to both,
the underlying schema of Crimes is
the Jewish philosophical tradition of
Hermann Cohen, Franz Rosenzweig

and Emmanuel Levinas, which
asserts that while the empirical
world of nature is morally neutral,
human beings can produce a moral
order that is inherently more real.
In other words, whereas the reason

of science can only describe an
apparent universe that is non-moral,
the reason of ethics can produce an
ideal universe that is moral. 0

Promise
The maple keeping the ravine edge
To a symetry of gold
Gave in today.
I saw its richness downed by wind,
As I sat listening to my small daughter,
Hard at the piano across the room from me.
It's only lately that I've noticed
The earnestness she fingers in to every note,
The way of her eyes cutting the world aside.
Leaning on the window sill,
I watched the branches stripped
And wondered about the hold we have on promiseLeaves whose yellow is teased through the air
Or my child caught up
By the bright coquetry of song.

Lucy Shawgo
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The Global Pillage
James Combs

Mature readers of The Cresset can
recall most of the signal events and
images associated with what was universally misnamed "The Cold War."
It was only "cold" to distinguish it
from the next step that many
thought inevitable of "hot" war,
World War III. From the breathtaking vantage point of Fall, 1990, the
history of the Cold War was hot
indeed: intense, scary, expensive,
and seemingly unending. Moreover,
it was global.
Every non-Western regime,
alliance, action, event or leader was
evaluated in terms of real or imagined relationship with communism.
American politics hinged on questions such as who was tougher on
the Reds, and in our more paranoid
fits, who was 'soft' on, or even sympathetic with the communists .
(Remember 'comsymp'?) It was official doctrine that we were willing to
fight and annihilate these mortal
foes, even at the risk of national,
and even worldwide, suicide in so
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doing. And, most infamously, we
were willing "to bear any burden"
and "pay any price," a pledge that
would cost us dearly in treasure,
pride, and lives. The Cold War went
on for so long that those whose
careers, wealth, and commitments
depended upon it became unable to
imagine the world without it.
Defense con tractors, think tanks,
and others who profited from it
obviously had a vested interest in it.
So did the military system, which
had a stake in its perpetuation, so
interest and ideology complemented nicely. Entire political careers
were spun out of its cloth, federal
budgets premised on its centrality,
and technology developed for its
needs. The Cold War was ingrained
in the popular mind as a reality and
a necessity.
Popular culture from comic
strips to TV series such as I Led Three
Lives made communists into archvillains. Usually, they were depicted as
gangsters, except their ambitions
were greater: rather than wanting
to take over the West Side, they
wanted to take over the Western
world. As with most villainous projections, they were depicted as both
superhuman and subhuman, certainly lacking in the human traits of
our society, and the humane conduct of our politics. In our minds,
we divided the world into one big
barrier ("The Iron Curtain," "The
Bamboo Curtain,") or spreading
Red stain. We seemed to keep 'losing' countries that weren't ours in
the first place, with accusatory
debates over whose fault it was that
we 'lost' China, Cuba, Vietnam, and

so on. With both elite interests and
the popular mind conceiving the
world as an implacable and unending place of mortal conflict, some
came to dread the virtual inevitability of war and others even came to
hope for it. In any case, we could
approach the world with an attitude
that was both smug and scared,
since our definition of the situation
insured its permanence.
Ah, but there is nothing constant in this world except change.
The geniuses who govern us
planned for everything in the
mighty struggle with 'world communism' except the absence of the
conflict with it. World War III was
planned down to its minutest detail.
The whole thing might start by accident; but by Mars, it was not going
to be a mistake. Those metaphysicians we call 'strategic thinkers'
debated the arcane theology of
overkill and acceptable losses and
mutual assured destruction. But
apparently no thought was given to
a time and situation in which the
whole enterprise ended. When Gorbachev apparently began to say, in
effect, 'Oh, the hell with it,' this new
thinking set in motion the dizzying
array of events that led to the advent
of the unthinkable.
In any case, we seem stunned by
the sudden disappearance of our
familiar nemesis, and we are looking
around in a rather bewildered way
to see just where the next move
ought to be. (Of course, we may
have had that decision made for us
by Saddam Hussein.) But when we
look at our alternatives In the newly
independent nations of Eastern and
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Central Europe, we are looking at
puzzling new game boards. Independence brings new choices and
hopes, and those with cash to invest
in these suddenly free countries
happily rush in. While we build
Stealth bombers and poormouth
the eastern Europeans, the Germans and Japanese get the lion's
share of the investments. If it is the
case that World War II ended in
1990, were the Americans and Russians the big losers and the Japanese
and the Germans the big winners?
Communism may have been the
last great internationalist ideology
in the modern world. In the postmodern world, there will be other
international forces, given energy
and direction through mutual interest rather than utopian vision. I can
see two such forces on the horizon:
the international corporation, and
international popular culture. Communism was not so much defeated
as it was transcended, for it could
not keep out, or transform, the
desire for a better life, the lure of
greed, or just simply the desire to
have fun. There is even some evidence that the East Germans in
particular were little impressed by
Radio Free Europe or the Voice of
America propaganda broadcasts.
They had plenty of daily experience
with official propaganda, and knew
it for what it was. But they could
also pick up West German television, and that may have had
significant impact. Ideological argument was a bore; ads for Volkswagen
and Lowenbrau reinforced the rationale to unifY into one Germany.
Now these national states will
be beset by the international corporation, which strikes me as the most
potent organizational force in the
world today. National states may be
the host or benefactor of the international corporation, but in the
aftermath of communism, and in
some measure of classical capitalism, the global firm is the one
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organization that will have the ability to act globally. Nation states think
locally, since domestic politics is
local; but global corporations (and
banks) act in a global economy, and
develop the organizational capacity
to reach into new markets.
What the eastern Europeans will
discover very quickly is that they are
being bombarded by corporate propaganda. The most visible of the
international corporations will be
those which specialize in consumer
products, those objects of personal
ownership with which we amuse ourselves. Everyone quickly will
recognize the logos of the corporate
world. In the spring of 1990, as the
East Germans entered the brave
new world of advertising, Ford
Motor Company ran a month long
campaign on TV featuring a German soccer star; General Motors
ran ads touting its German subsidiary, Adam Opel. Coca Cola
began sponsoring sporting events
and fairs, altogether spending $140
million in East German production,
distribution, and advertising (they
also now have the landmark neon
billboard in Moscow's Pushkin
Square). Big advertising firms, such
as Ogilvy & Mather and J. Walter
Thompson, have opened offices in
East Berlin, anxious to develop
clients and pitches for this new market. And on the first day East
German television accepted advertising, Mattei ran ads for-you
guessed it-Barbie.
In some ways, the lives of these
people will be enhanced by the economic intervention of the
international corporations. Yet they
too will quickly learn the price of
prosperity, both in monetary and
moral terms. Communism could
not sustain either economic prosperity nor moral rectitude, which
discredited the old regimes on two
crucial counts. The new regimes at
the moment have the legitimacy of
being part of the revolutionary lead-

ership, but- that will pale if people
begin to sense that international
corporations are not benefactors as
much as exploiters who take more
than they give. What General
Motors did to Flint, Michigan, or is
now doing in Mexico with cheap
labor, could be done to eastern
Europe. The social and environmental damage that has been done
elsewhere could just as well be done
in Bulgaria and Romania. If international corporations are unrestrained
in their global pillage, then the
'market values' that sustain economic prosperity will become suspect as
lacking in moral rectitude, and
movements sounding for all the
world like marxists might emerge
demanding restraint on exploitation.
On the other hand, the globalization of the economy is
accompanied by what is often called
'the spreading world culture.' International corporations may operate
in the amoral context of business,
but global pillage becomes something of which more and more
people are aware. Yet the international corporation is also the carrier
of this spreading world culture, at
least in the sense of selling music,
art, movies, books, and so forth.
Their penetration into eastern
Europe, not to mention the Third
World, insures the spread of that
culture, both high and popular.
Like the spread of the marketplace
values of the corporation, the worldwide proliferation of popular
culture especially is not an unalloyed blessing. When the East
Germans get a whiff of heavy metal
rock, they may demand the return
of the Reds to shut down the noise.
But even though a lot of popular
culture is crass and vulgar, it does
have the salutary effect of giving
people a common cultural currency.
The thirst of Czechs and Poles and
Germans is not just for money, but
also for the common popular cul-
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tural cultural experiences they knew
the West was enjoying.
Market values by themselves,
however, bring nothing more than
the bread on which we cannot live
alone. The power of popular culture is such that it will bring with it a
new horizon of experience, something that has the potential to give
humankind increasingly a common
language, a kind of pop esperanto.
In many ways, globalized popular
culture has been a going concern
for a long time. Despite the cultural
restrictions, eastern European films
(just to use one example) of remarkable quality managed to deal with
sensitive and serious subjects, and
also made their way West Now that
the restrictions are gone, we may
fondly hope that they do not lose
their sensitivity or their seriousness.
The downside, and corrupting,
aspect of popular culture always is
the impulse toward the lower common denominators, including the
insensitive and the frivolous.
This is not to say that forms of
popular entertainment (wrestling
and soap operas, for instance) cannot be enjoyed just as amusing play.
But if the spreading world popular
culture is to have any impact in giving us a common language through
which we may understand each other's particularity, we are going to
have to learn ways to reward popular creativity. If the money powers
that will control modes of popular
expression insist upon sticking to
the safe and formulaic, then the
hopes that an international culture
might enlighten will dim. If our
popular creations remain provincial
and superficial, then different peoples will lose their chance to have
some insight into other cultures
through sharing a common language. Americans, just to pick on
us, could remain insular and selfabsorbed, insensitive to the
experience of foreign cultures and
reveling in the frivolity that omits
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serious subjects. American popular
culture in recent years seems to me
to have such tendencies. There has
been a strong strain of self-absorption, and much pressure to suppress
not only the lewd but also and more
importantly, the critical aspects of
popular culture.
Older Anglos in the United
States see themselves threatened by
two popular expressions by minorities in their midst: salsa and
lambada music and dance created
by Latin Americans, and the rap
music of a segment of our AfroAmerican population. Both forms of
expression are viewed as frightening
in their sensuality, but rap music in
particular is feared also for its politics. If you view the rap hour on
M1V, you do learn some crosscultural understanding: there is a lot of
rage at the bottom of society, a great
deal of pride and pathos, and the
political icon is not so much Martin
Luther King, Jr. as it is Malcolm X.
Some rap is just for fun, but some of
it is quite serious, and you can learn
a lot about the state of things outside the pale of your own
experience if you heed such popular
expression.
The same principle of course
applies to other countries and their
cultures. If we can overcome our
own ethnocentric fears, we all can
learn a lot about other peoples. (I
recall President Reagan, on his trip
to the Soviet Union, giving a gift to
President Gorbachev of the American film Friendly Persuasion, saying
that it would tell him a lot about
America. True, but one thinks Reagan could have benefited if he had
sat down and seriously watched
Eisenstein's Ivan the Terrible, which
would have told him much more
about the Russians than all the
rhetorical demonology conjured at
meetings of the Committee for the
Free World.)
As any glance at the business
page of the newspaper will tell you,

the future of the United States
depends upon its willingness to participate in, and indeed become an
active part of, the new world rising
from the ashes of the old. The old
world was one of frontiers and barriers, of mutual suspicions and tribal
hatreds. If the new one is in any
sense going to be different from the
old, it will be because people on all
sides of fallen barriers avail themselves of the opportunity to
participate in other people's cultural experience. We cannot travel to
all countries, nor learn everyone
else's languages; but we can take
seriously their more important
forms of popular expression as an
entry into understanding them.
Humankind has a real opportunity at this moment to overcome
some of the ignorance that engulfed
the dying century in cycles of warfare. Now with the 'wired' world
before us, we have a chance to rectify some of that ignorance. Spinoza
wrote long ago of human bondage
and human freedom, arguing that
freedom comes by letting the infinite variety of the world into your
mind. Popular culture as a global
force could become for those so
willing to be free a playful language
of understanding. It could celebrate those things which tend to
unite us, the Earth's environment
for one, than those which divide us.
As a political force, it could help
in minimizing the political and economic pillage that bedeviled the old
world. If aspects of popular culture
such as music do contribute to creating a world beyond pillage, it will be
worth the noise. For that reason, it
was altogether fitting and proper
that the demise of the Berlin Wall
was celebrated not by a pompous
gathering of politicians but by a
huge concert featuring the spandex,
leather, and metal marks of the rock
culture. 0
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Of China,
and Other
Imponderables
R. Keith Schoppa. Xiang Lake: Nine
Centuries of Chinese Life. New Haven:
Yale University Press, 1989.
In the opening lines of Xiang
Lake, the author asks us the following question:
Xiang Lake: a six thousand-acre
reservoir ten miles from scenic West
Lake in the city of Hangzhou. Nothing
of national importance either in the
empire, republic, or people's republic
ever occurred there; no disastrous rebellions or other social disturbances ever
began there; no conferences of national
significance were ever held there; no figure of national scope ever rose from its
shores; none of China's preeminent
poets wrote of its beauty. In the vast
sweep of China's history it seems, on the
whole, quite forgettable, a lake of little
significance. Why then should we spend
time at Xiang Lake? (xi)
Why indeed? To answer that
question forces us to consider first
some questions about historiography. For to say that nothing of
national significance happened at
Xiang Lake is not to say that nothing happened. This may seem an
obvious point, at least until one recollects that most Chinese history,
written by Chinese or foreigners,
has been almost exclusively dominated by national events and figures.
Local or regional histories are a rei-
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atively new thing in Chinese
historiography, and for the most
part are a reflection of the influence
of Western historiography, where
such texts have only recently
regained legitimacy.
In the West, in fact, local and
regional histories are nothing new.
As far back as the Greeks we find
examples such as Hellanicus' study
of Attica, Diyllus' of Athens,
Nymphis' of Heracleia Pontica and
Hieronymus' of Cardia. Later still,
studies of cities such as London,
Cologne and Paris were common.
From 1200 onward, towns all over
Europe, and later in America, had
chroniclers who compiled impressive amounts of data, occasionally
organized and presented as a history of the region. One of the most
highly regarded European examples
in this vein was The Great Annals of
Cologne, with such American counterparts as Thomas Prince's
Chronological History of New England
and Robert Beverly's History of Virginia.
In the modern period, under
the influence of Leopold von Ranke
and the German school of the late
19th century, historiography for the
most part turned away from the
regional and local to concentrate
upon the national, international
and even universal. The regional
and local were like so many specks
when seen from the almost divine
altitude from which many of these
histories were written. Localities
only came to view if they played
some role in a major historical
event.
But beginning in the 20th century, we see a gradual turning back

to a concern with the regional for its
own sake. In part due to the rise of
social history, which turned its attention to the common people, history
now took a number of different
directions. Some historians, under
the influence of marxist philosophy,
were concerned with the underclasses struggling for liberation, while
others, under more democratic
influences, believed that the common people embodied the spirit or
genius of a nation. Social histories
such as those pioneered by Arthur
Schlesinger, Sr., focused upon what
he liked to call "the Great Many"
rather than the "Great Men" of history. While it is true that these early
social histories took up the cause of
the common many and paid attention to some local and regional
concerns, in the end their ultimate
concern was still the grand scheme
rather than the sense of local meaning. The common, the local, the
regional were taken primarily as
examples of something larger than
themselves.
In Paris a group of historians
took the idea of social history to a
new level. The work of the annales
group, under the influence of
Lucien Febvre and Marc Bloc,
turned away from the macrohistorical approach in order to focus upon
what they called "total history."
Total history attempts to deal with
all aspects of life. As Febvre put it in
his book from 1953, Combats pour
l 'histoire:
History must cease to appear as a sleeping necropolis haunted solely by
shadowy schemes. They [the historians] .. . must penetrate in to the old
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silent palace where the princess slumbers, throw the windows wide open,
relight the candelabra, bring back the
world of sound; then they will with their
own vitality, with their own bubbling and
young vitality, awaken the suspended life
in the sleeping princess. (32)
Total history shows a new concern for the regional in that the key
to understanding is in the details
themselves, and not in the search
for some overriding pattern. If patterns (what the annales call
mentalite) emerge, they do so from a
multifaced and finely-nuanced
attention to the details. Universal
histories were seen as reductionist in
their denial or ignorance of the
local, the small, the seemingly
insignificant events and people.
The thrust of total history is to give
even the most trivial its due. History
thus becomes the story of a place
and time. As such it should draw
upon everything at its disposal, from
politics and
economics
to
geography, meteorology, documents, art and music. Anything
which helps the historian bring the
period to life-that awakens the
sleeping princess-is legitimate. History is no longer the search for a
solution to universal problems, but
the creation of a richly textured
object which has value in itself. This
concentration on detail, and abandonment of the belief in the Big
Picture, has lent legitimacy to the
local and regional historian who
does his or her work by drawing
upon masses of multiform materials
in order to understand a place and a
time. The method implies that if
there is any place where the spirit,
the lived ideas, the sense of custom,
the feeling for the rhythms of a people can be found, it is in the stories
of the local peoples. History has no
need to try to ti'e such stories back
into some macrohistorical scheme.
Xiang Lake is such a microhistory, but with a difference. It studies a
small and seemingly insignificant
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subject-a reservoir. However, this
small subject is studied for its
appearance over an enormous
length of time, from 1112 until
1986. In nine intriguing chapters,
Professor Schoppa indeed "awakens
the sleeping princess" by composing
his wonderfully-textured object to
depict the lives and culture which
surrounded and depended upon
the lake over a period of roughly
nine centuries.
The key to the success of the
book is the author's careful attention, not just to what we would call
'fact,' but to the quality of the writing itself. The reader is slowly
drawn into a series of small dramas,
each crafted with the skill of the
short story writer. Characterization
and wit, apt descriptions of the land
or a sunset, speculations about the
moods of the characters-all these
absorb the reader into the world of
the lake. They make it live in the
reader's imagination as a whole
world, miniature but nonetheless
compelling in its sense of dazzling
reality.
Professor Schoppa begins each
section with a brief prefatory "View."
Here he attempts to establish the
tone of the chapter to follow. Each
"View" begins with just that, a
glimpse of the lake or the mountains, lands, temples, pavilions and
gardens which can be seen from the
lake. Over the course of nine chapters, one gets a splendid sense not
only of the area's appearance, but
also of its emotional effects. These
descriptive forays are supplemented
by a number of photographs and
maps to further aid the reader as he
or she enters this alien world. The
remainder of each section is composed of a series of vignettes of
various lengths which relate important local events, the lives of
important local people, and generally build upon the reader's sense
for the period and the place as it
floats through the historical landscape which surrounds it. Unlike

the large sweeping stories which are
usually written about China, this
one invites us to feel at home in this
place, to identify with the people
and their problems, to hate the
interference of outsiders and generally to care about what happens in
this obscure corner of Zhejiang
province. By the end of the book,
the reader not only has a sense of
Xiang Lake's history, but also of
what it would be like to have lived
here.
I am particularly struck by the
relevance of the phrase that the
more things change, the more they
stay the same. With the exception
of the Taiping rebellion and the
occasional clash with imperial or
republican politics, the people of
Xiang Lake live local lives, consumed with local problems that
confront them in local ways. It is
from this perspective that Schoppa
expects us to read the book. Thus,
one must first get over an initial disappointment that he does not draw
out the connections between Xiang
Lake and the broader scope of Chinese history. We gradually accept
that the author asks us to take on
the local perspective, to see that the
truth about the region is to be discovered by allowing oneself to enter
fully into the local mindset.
We gradually realize too that
Schoppa's opening declaration that
nothing significant happened here
involves us directly in the paradoxes
of this form of history. Our
glimpses of Chinese life, of the lived
values, of the daily struggles of people and place both with and against
each other gradually do serve to
develop our understanding of the
whole picture. As any student of
Chinese history is aware, to know
the people you must know the land.
In Xiang Lake, this relationship is
paramount. The insights we have
in to politics, social structures, and
lineage as all these affect and are
affected by the land itself show us
more than the sum of the parts. As

31

we know about the parts, we begin
to sense the whole.
This book is hard to find fault
with for two reasons. The first, and
superficial one, is that Professor
Schoppa can have few readers who
know his subject as he does. If there
are any who can or would challenge
him on this front, they will have
come from the handful of experts
on Zhejiang province, but I suspect
that even they are unlikely to know
as much about Xiang Lake and the
Xiaoshan region. The more profound reason for my enthusiastic
endorsement of the book is that it is
one of that rare category of books
valuable and eyeopening to the specialist and amateur alike. In this,
Schoppa's book reminds one of the
work of Jonathan Spence, both
expert and accessible, informed
and elegant
James Buchanan

Geoffrey R. Lilburne. A Sense of
Place: A Christian Theology of the Land.
Nashville: Abingdon Press, 1989.
140 pp, pbk.
Here is the wisest and perhaps
the most stimulating recent addition
to the growing field of 'green theology.' By this phrase, I refer to
constructive theological works that
give renewed attention to the nonhuman world. For Geoffrey R.
Lilburne, Christians need not only
to clean up the environment, but to
renew their sense of place through a
deeper understanding of the incarnation ofJesus Christ on earth.
Dr. Lilburne is a professor of
theology at the United Theological
School in Dayton, Ohio. He was
raised in Australia, and part of the
unique flavor of this book derives
from the illuminating parallels he
draws for us between the land-centered practices of Australian
Aborigines and the Hebrews of the
Old Testament What he does, final32

ly, is to update Walter Brueggeman's
fine study, The Land: Place as Gift,
Promise and Challenge in Biblical Faith
(Fortress, 1977), with anthropological sensitivity, poetic insight and
careful biblical scholarship.
It is precisely attention to the
Bible that is missing in so much
"theology of Creation" these days.
In the works of the Dominican
Matthew Fox, for example, the clear
tendency is to focus so intesely on
creation that the biblical focus on
God's redemptive activity drops out
of the picture almost completely.
We see a similar tendency in books
such as Beauty of the Lord: Awakening
the Senses (John Knox, 1988) by the
environmental theologian Richard
Cartwright Austin.
Lilburne notices that particularly in the Old Testament, the word
"land" draws us deeply in to the
movement of biblical history. He
therefore states a firm preference
for a "theology of the land" over a
"theology of creation."
For all its validity as a direction in
contemporary theological reflection, creation theology often calls us
to a simple return to the garden of
life. Though all creation was good
"in the beginning," contemporary
experience should be enough to
warn us that no simple return to
Eden is available.
The book is aimed at seminary
students, college professors and
church leaders with seminary training. Lilburne's writing is overly
condensed at times--particularly as
he examines the Western philosophical tradition-and in Chapter 4
some familiarity with Brueggeman's
earlier book will help. But when
read with care, Lilburne's book is a
fme entry point to a new and growing field of study.
Wayne Bolton

James F. White. Protestant Worship:
Traditions in Transition. Louisville:
Westminster/John Knox Press, 1989.
This important study of worship
among Christians who are not
Roman Catholic or Eastern Orthodox will deserve its likely popularity
as a textbook. White combines a
wealth of details with an ingenuity
of scheme: "Protestant" worship
comprises on the right wing Lutherans and Anglicans, in the center
Reformed and Methodists, and on
the left wing adherents of the
Anabaptist, Quaker, Frontier and
Pentecostal traditions. In addition,
he chooses to focus not just on the
texts of the rites that are used but
especially on the people who engage
in the action of worship. And he
argues that the central defining
characteristic of "Protestant" worship is its essentially non- or eve-n
anti-sacramental character, being
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based, he argues, more on a celebration of the Word and the exercise of
prayer.
While one must welcome the
gathered information White presents, one must raise two serious
questions. First, is there in fact a
single, unitary "Protestant" tradition
in worship, one that can be defined
essentially by its non-Roman/nonEastern character? It might well be
argued (as it has by Frank Senn)
that
the
Lutheran/Anglican/Methodist (and
perhaps Disciples) branches of
Christianity are one tradition, and
that the Reformed are another, that
Free Church and Chrismatic
branches of Christianity are a third
and possibly also fourth. And second, is Protestantism, however
defined, fundamentally anti-sacramental? This Lutheran reviewer
finds the former question to disclose
a highly debatable problem, and the
second question to require a decided 'No' as answer. In fact, White's
choice of Luther's Babylonian Captivity of the Church as his point of
departure should be sufficient evidence
of
the
profoundly
sacramental concern and orientation of Luther's program of
liturgical reform, and similar arguments would show the profoundly
sacramental character of Anglican,
Methodist, and even Reform worship. Still, White's book has much
to commend it. And even the quesions it raises are worthy of careful
attention.
David G. Truemper
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Robert Wuthnow. The Struggle for
America's Soul: Evangelicals, Liberals,
and Secularism. Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1989.
Princeton sociologist Robert
Wuthnow is doing his best to overcome his training as a positivist. Still,
in this intriguing book, which
attempts both to describe a struggle
within American society and to construct an argument urging liberal
and evangelical Christians to get
beyond their often ignoble disagreements, Wuthnow only occasionally
succeeds.
Our author is concerned about
America. He believes a "growing
polarization of religion's response to
the public sphere" threatens to produce a society prone on the one
hand to totalitarian politics, and on
the other to solipsistic religion of
either secularist or fundamentalistic
stripes. The evangelical-liberal middle ground, which . Wuthnow
identifies as the historic core of the
"third (non-market, non-state) sector," has eroded.
Is this news? Wuthnow at length
(if fuzzily) characterizes the conflict
between liberal and connive believers, bringing the struggle into
clearest focus by studying one "by
no means unique" denominationthe Presbyterians. In fact, the sample is neither random nor
representative, but the case study
sets up Wuthnow's argument well.
The sociologist is at his best
when describing the "Dynamics of

the Secular." A chapter "Paradox
and Media" is especially insightful,
in which the author details how the
electronic church has in fact promoted public awareness of religious
issues, while at the same time conditioning viewers of religious
television to be passive and routinized public agents, acting in
accord with "god's" mediated word.
This is effective applied sociology,
advancing our understanding
beyond the stereotype of the couchpotato consumer ofPray-1V.
Too often, though, Wuthnow
leaves us with platitudes. This is a
book designed for a general, popular audience, but even the most
ill-informed American could hardly
be enlightened by reading that
"much is changing in American religion," or that issues such as
abortion, prayer in schools, and politics in Central America, "will
continue to be subjects of intense
debate by religious groups." Writing
a book for a popular audience need
not be an excuse to dummy-down
one's discipline.
At worst, this book may actually
reinforce the polarizations between
Christians and the marginalization
of Christianity in American life. It is
neither enough of an analysis of the
functions of the conflict nor enough
of a passionate argument to be a
remedy. At best, this effort by Wuthnow outlines some interesting
stereotypes, and occasionally illumines their shortcomings.

Jon Pahl
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Over the years, this journal has been consistently
interested in the question of Christian higher education, and many articles on the subject have been
printed here. We now announce a competition for the best article
on this subject by a writer under thirty-five.
Articles should be between 2,500-3,500 words, suitable for a general audience. A prize of $250 will be awarded to the au thor of the
winning article, which will be published in an issue devoted to work
by younger writers and artists.

The deadline for submission is 1 January 1990, and entries will be read by
members of the Advisory Board, and the editor, who will make the final
decision. Entries should be submitted with name, address and proof of age
on a separate sheet. For further information, please write The Cresset, Valparaiso University, Valparaiso, IN 46383. (Note the change in age limit.)

0 Cresset Creation Colloquium continues with Jim Caristi on changing
DNA and Spotted Owls, and Jim Bachman on Creation, Luther
and the Bible.
0
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Tom Kennedy reviews Wendell Berry's What Are People For?
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Midwest Autum

The maple flames out
against the October sky,
burning bush for us.

The owl's note quivers,
wavers on the still night air,
chilling every bone.

The grey hawk lifts, banks,
riding November's rough winds,
partner with the sky.

Barbara Jurgensen

